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ABSTRACT: While military personnel are often involved in the design of 
information technology, the literature on military innovation generally 
assumes defense contractors are the primary producers.  Furthermore, 
general organizational theories of user innovation have only been tested on 
cases involving corporate employees or private citizens in substantially 
less regulated environments than military users.  This paper examines user 
innovation theory in a military context through a historical study of the 
user-led development of FalconView, the popular standard for digital 
mapping applications throughout the U.S. military and some other 
government organizations.  This paper finds that while user innovation 
theory can explain aspects of the emergence and diffusion of military user 
innovation, existing theory understates the challenges involved with 
generating and sustaining user innovation within a complex bureaucracy.  
Successfully innovating users must be creative with organizational as well 
as technical resources. 
 
 
The debate over the effect of information technology on war—often called the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)—has attracted enthusiastic forecasts of sweeping 
change1 and skeptical criticism,2 yet it has cast surprisingly little light on the practical 
day-to-day experience of computer users in military organizations.  Too rarely noticed is 
that a lot of software in use within military organizations is actually designed or modified 
by personnel, often working around the problems of traditionally procured software 
programs.  User-developed macros, databases, low-level utilities, web pages, and even 
sophisticated programs can be found on military networks, interwoven with 
commercially produced software and custom software written by defense-contractors.  
The iconic RMA image of lightning bolts arcing around a network of ships, aircraft, 
                                                 
1 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, In Athena's Camp: Preparing For Conflict in the Information Age 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997); David S. Alberts et al., Network Centric Warfare: 
Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority (Washington D.C.: CCRP Publications Series, 1999); 
William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000). 
2 Jeremy Shapiro, “Information and War: Is It a Revolution?” in Strategic Appraisal: the Changing Role of 
Information in Warfare, ed. Zalmay Khalilzad (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 113-153; 
Michael E. O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000); Eliot A. Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs," Journal of 
Strategic Studies vol. 27, no. 3 (2004): 395-407; Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and 
Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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satellites, and ground vehicles obscures the fact that low-level innovation is oiling the 
entire command, control, and intelligence machine.3 
Improvisation is an important part of organizational life, 4  yet is especially 
pronounced with information technology because of its complex and changeable 
insinuation into organizational practices. 5   For military organizations as well, 
improvisations, field expedients, jury-rigs, and technical stratagems abound in combat 
histories.6  Ever since the Greeks built the Trojan Horse without bidding the project out to 
contractors, the frictions and surprises of real operations have exposed shortfalls in 
doctrine and technology and motivated personnel to cobble together expedient solutions.  
There are, moreover, several reasons to expect information technology expedients to be 
especially prevalent.  First, military operations have a large and growing information 
processing load because of sophisticated weapons systems, the intelligence and planning 
requirements of missions like precision strike and counter-terrorism, and a fluid strategic 
environment of coalition, interagency, non-governmental, and adversarial actors.  Second, 
the defense acquisition bureaucracy, already inefficient in procuring massive hardware 
projects, is especially ill adapted to software production.7  Third, powerful and flexible 
                                                 
3 As Joshua Davis, "If We Run Out of Batteries, This War Is Screwed," Wired (June 2003) reports: “I 
tracked the network from the generals' plasma screens at Central Command to the forward nodes on the 
battlefields in Iraq. What I discovered was something entirely different from the shiny picture of techno-
supremacy touted by the proponents of the Rumsfeld doctrine. I found an unsung corps of geeks 
improvising as they went, cobbling together a remarkable system from a hodgepodge of military-built 
networking technology, off-the-shelf gear, miles of Ethernet cable, and commercial software. And during 
two weeks in the war zone, I never heard anyone mention the revolution in military affairs.”   
4  Wanda J. Orlikowski, "Improvising Organizational Transformation Over Time: A Situated Change 
Perspective," Information Systems Research vol. 7, no. 1 (1996): 63-93, Karl E. Weick, "Introductory 
Essay: Improvisation As a Mindset For Organizational Analysis," Organization Science vol. 9, no. 5 
(1998): 543-555, Ted Baker and Reed E. Nelson, "Creating Something From Nothing: Resource 
Construction Through Entrepreneurial Bricolage," Administrative Science Quarterly vol. 50, no. 3 (2005): 
329-366. 
5 John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, The Social Life of Information (Boston, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press, 2000), Claudio Ciborra, The Labyrinths of Information: Challenging the Wisdom of Systems 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
6 A few texts treat this theme explicitly: John H. Hay, Tactical and Materiel Innovations, Vietnam Studies 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974),  Center of Military History, Improvisations During the 
Russian Campaign (Washington DC: United States Army, 1986), Michael D. Doubler, Closing With the 
Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (University Press of Kansas, 1995) 
7The Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Software 
(November 2000), found that “software is rapidly becoming a significant, if not the most significant, 
portion of DoD acquisitions” and yet “programs lacked well thought-out, disciplined program management 
and/or software development processes.”  The study furthermore noted that almost all the major problems 
identified in six major Department of Defense studies on software acquisition since 1987 had not been 
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software tools are available at relatively low cost, and the U.S. military population is 
increasingly computer literate and well educated.  In sum, contemporary U.S. military 
operations generate a high demand for information processing power, acquisition 
institutions are ill suited to efficiently supply it, and at the same time personnel are 
empowered to try and supply it for themselves. 
Nonetheless, would-be user technology developers in the military lack the legitimacy 
of official bureaucratic acquisition and certification processes, and they are constrained 
by short tours-of-duty and other war-fighting responsibilities.  Although short-term 
expedients to deal with the exigencies of combat are an expected part of warfare, in the 
long-term, military technology is generally procured and managed through a complicated 
system of contractors, government managers, military staff officers, politicians, and 
lawyers.  Given the high potential for jurisdictional conflict with procurement and 
technology management regimes, the interesting questions are whether and how 
spontaneous user innovation can possibly give rise to important long-term organizational 
consequences.   
This paper begins with a discussion of bottom-up user innovation in the literature on 
military innovation and in business-oriented innovation theory.  Because it is missing 
from the former and has not yet been applied to military organizations within the latter, 
the paper next frames expectations about user innovation in the idiosyncratic military 
context.  These are next examined in a historical case study of FalconView, a software 
application that emerged through user efforts to develop automated planning tools within 
the U.S. Air National Guard F-16 community, yet which went on to become the popular 
standard for operational geospatial applications throughout the military services and some 
other government agencies as well.  This case is then generalized in a discussion of how 
                                                                                                                                                 
corrected (pp. ES1-ES2, 3).  Similarly, U.S. General Accounting Office, Stronger Management Practices 
Are Needed to Improve DOD’s Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions (GAO-04-393, 2004) observes, 
“DOD estimates that it spends about 40 percent of its Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation budget 
on software—$21 billion for fiscal year 2003. Furthermore, DOD and industry experience indicates that 
about $8 billion (40 percent) of that amount may be spent on reworking software because of quality-related 
issues….DOD did not have effective and consistent corporate or software processes for software 
acquisitions,” (p. 1).  Also see David C. Gompert et al., Extending the User's Reach: Responsive 
Networking For Integrated Military Operations (National Defense University, Center For Technology and 
National Security Policy, Defense and Technology Paper 24, 2006) for a detailed critique of information 
technology procurement. 
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changes in supply and demand side factors can promote user innovation, while 
organizational politics nevertheless resist shifting to the new equilibrium. 
Explaining Military User Innovation 
Like defense procurement institutions, major theories of military innovation have 
been built around large-scale capital-intensive projects such as tanks, aircraft carriers, and 
nuclear missiles.  For such systems, the question of the source of production—user or 
contractor?—need never come up.  When only private contractors or public arsenals have 
the capacity for heavy industrial production, a clear division of labor between producer 
and operational user can safely be assumed.  Users may be able to perform some post-
production modifications to heavy equipment, as when American soldiers in WWII 
fashioned hedgerow cutters for Sherman tanks from German beach obstacles,8 or create 
small-scale prototypes later mass-produced by contractors, as was the case with 
submarine emergency escape breathing lungs 9  and the first aviation helmets with 
embedded radios.10  However, the primary technological functionality associated with 
significant military change in the industrial era has generally been built on the assembly 
line, with significant per-unit costs.  This is not necessarily so for software development, 
where programs for a PC can be written on a PC within operationally relevant timeframes, 
where perfect copies can be distributed via floppy disk or networks for negligible cost, 
and where understanding the detailed context of use is especially critical to the design 
process.  Short of industrial mass-production, a clear division of labor between developer 
and user cannot be assumed ex ante. 
The types of theories advanced to explain military innovation include civilian 
intervention in response to strategic threat,11  intraservice generational change led by 
visionary senior officers, 12  and interservice bureaucratic competition. 13   While 
                                                 
8 Doubler, Closing With the Enemy, 44-46. 
9 Peter Maas, The Terrible Hours: The Man Behind the Greatest Submarine Rescue in History (New York, 
NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999) 
10 Timothy Scott Wolters, Managing a Sea of Information: Shipboard Command and Control in the United 
States Navy, 1899-1945 (Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT Program Science, Technology, and Society, 2003), 102. 
11 Barry R. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars 
(Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: 
Lessons From Peripheral Wars (Cornell University Press, 1994). 
12 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1991) 
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appreciating that the technology involved in these studies is invariably industrially 
produced, it’s also important to note that these theories are crafted to explain 
organizational and doctrinal innovations for the employment of technology, rather than 
the emergence of innovative technology itself.  A related literature on the diffusion of 
military innovation examines diffusion across militaries,14 but by focusing on industrially 
produced technology, it also leaves open the question of the functional origin of 
innovation (user or contractor).  As a group these macro-level mechanisms don’t speak to 
whether and how sources of significant technological variation might emerge bottom-up 
from deep within the organization.  While these approaches may become important 
should user innovation become disruptive enough to require protection or championing 
from senior leadership, it’s nevertheless conceivable that a great deal of change might be 
initiated and sustained “below the radar” before that occurs.   
Some studies of innovation in tactical doctrine highlight the importance of bottom-up 
trial-and-error and diffusion of successful practices during wartime.15  The high intensity 
combat characteristic of the World Wars gave rise to a more-or-less Darwinian process in 
which many novel tactical variations could be attempted, most perishing with the units 
that tried them, yet some selected and reinforced through employment and ad-hoc 
training.  These studies focus on tactical employment more than technological design, but 
the same operational incentives that encourage tactical innovation by personnel could 
encourage technological innovation as well if barriers to entry for technological design 
were low enough.  Eliot Cohen asserts that “change tends to come more from below, 
from the spontaneous interactions between military people, technology and particular 
tactical circumstances,”16  yet he leaves the task of fleshing out these  “spontaneous 
interactions” to others. 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in 
Government (Harvard University Press, 1972), Owen R. Coté, The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: 
the US Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles (Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT Department of Political Science, 1996) 
14 Thomas W. Zarzecki, Arms Diffusion: the Spread of Military Innovations in the International System 
(New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, The Diffusion of Military 
Technology and Ideas (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003) 
15 Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the 
First World War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), Doubler, 
Closing With the Enemy. 
16 Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs," 400-401. 
 7
In the commercial world, users often exploit technology’s “interpretive flexibility,” 
sometimes leading to significant industrial change, 17  so organization theory on user 
innovation, most explicitly articulated by Eric Von Hippel,18 is a sensible place to begin.  
A primary hypothesis of Von Hippel’s theory is that variation in the functional source of 
innovation—user, manufacturer, or supplier—is caused by variation in actors’ expected 
innovation-related gains.  Users gain from immediate in-house results, manufacturers can 
gain only when a user market clearly exists, and suppliers gain when they can enhance or 
complement the market for the goods they supply.  Actors’ expected gains are influenced 
by their relative abilities to maintain monopoly control over an innovation, anticipated 
costs and benefits of the innovation, and transaction costs of alternative contracting 
arrangements.  Transaction costs between users and manufacturers can be quite high 
because of principal-agent monitoring costs, production time lags, and particularly 
because knowledge of user needs and manufacturer technologies is often tacit, embodied, 
and situated,19 making it difficult to specify accurate requirements.  A primary prediction 
of the theory is that increasing transaction costs while lowering production costs (through 
changes in user knowledge and resource availability) will shift the functional locus of 
innovation from manufacturers to users. 
The theory advances three further hypotheses about user innovation specifically.  
First, user innovation should be most prevalent among “lead users,” who are users that 
are experiencing emerging market needs in advance of other users and who stand to 
immediately benefit from finding a solution.  Second, users will tend to freely reveal their 
innovations to other users because those others may contribute knowledge or resources to 
improve the innovation, and because free revealing enhances the innovator’s reputation 
and feelings of group solidarity.  Third, user innovation tends to be widely distributed in 
self-reinforcing “innovation communities,” where free revealing leads to increasing 
                                                 
17 Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, "Users As Agents of Technological Change: the Social Construction of 
the Automobile in the Rural United States," Technology and Culture vol. 37, no. 4 (1996): 763-795, David 
N. Lucsko, Manufacturing Muscle: the Hot Rod Industry and the American Fascination With Speed, 1915-
1985 (Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT Program in Science, Technology, and Society, 2005). 
18  Eric Von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation (Oxford University Press, 1988), Eric Von Hippel, 
Democratizing Innovation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
19 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1974), Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), Wanda J. Orlikowski, "Knowing in Practice: Enacting a Collective 
Capability in Distributed Organizing," Organization Science vol. 13, no. 3 (2002): 249-273. 
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returns for all.  This phenomenon is often noted regarding open-source software projects, 
where a large distributed user group can efficiently identify bugs, find programmers who 
know how to fix them, and explore idiosyncratic new use cases more efficiently than 
traditionally managed projects.20 
Finally, the theory expects production to shift from users to manufacturers once 
transaction costs diminish and the needs of the user population become well understood, 
since this shifts the relative expected gain to manufacturers and thus the functional locus 
of production.21  As a result, lead users often innovate novel prototypes in emerging 
markets while manufacturers innovate improvements on established products with 
healthy markets.  Manufacturers can take advantage of this asymmetry by intentionally 
lowering the cost of user innovation by providing toolkits, such as application 
programming interfaces (APIs), to facilitate user modification, extension, or design.  Of 
course, if transaction costs don’t diminish even after markets are established, then user 
innovation communities may maintain an enduring competitive advantage (as may be the 
case with some open-source software projects, since software contracting problems are 
notoriously difficult). 
These hypotheses are well supported by evidence from a wide variety of industries 
ranging from scientific instrumentation, extreme sports equipment, semiconductor 
manufacturing, computer hardware, and computer software.22  However, the users in this 
sample are exclusively corporate employees or private citizens.  Does the theory still 
work in a military environment, where users are involved in the peculiar business of war 
and are situated within vast complex bureaucracies? 
Unlike any other formal organization, militaries are concerned with the direct, 
physical destruction of like kinds.  Despite their awesome capabilities, military 
organizations can actually be somewhat fragile because complex uncertainty becomes an 
existential problem.  The stabilizing routines and structures that emerge in response can 
                                                 
20 Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: O'Reilly, 2001), 
Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, "Some Simple Economics of Open Source," The Journal of Industrial 
Economics vol. 50, no. 2 (2002): 197-234 
21 Carliss Baldwin et al., “The Migration of Products From Lead User-Innovators to Manufacturers,” MIT 
Sloan School of Management Working Paper (No. 4554-05, 2005) 
22 Summarized in Von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation, and Von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation. 
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thus be expected to resist change even more than normal bureaucracy.23  To be precise, 
it’s not that military processes are resistant to technological change per se, but rather that, 
as Janowitz points out, “the process of innovation in the military establishment itself has 
become routinized.”24  These formal procurement routines, based on a clear distinction 
between technology user and provider, tend to select against uncontrolled user innovation 
(in ways discussed later).   
Furthermore, there is a quite different legal and structural relationship between a user 
and a manufacturer than there is between military personnel and acquisition systems: the 
former are independent actors in a market while the latter are part of a military hierarchy.  
Military personnel operate within a highly regulated, high-risk environment that 
constrains resources available to them.  They remain in specific jobs for only a few years 
at most before transferring.  They are evaluated for some war-fighting specialty other 
than technology development.  Finally, “The Professional officer corps' emphasis on 
hierarchy, the chain of command, obedience, and loyalty, make challenge from below 
somewhat less probable than one might find in a non-military organization.”25 
Given these considerations, if user innovation theory can successfully predict and 
explain significant user innovation even in an environment as idiosyncratic and 
seemingly hostile to user innovation as the military, that would provide strong evidence 
in support of it.   
The Functional Sources of Military Innovation 
Before proceeding on to that test, it’s important to first characterize the functional 
sources of particularly military innovation in more detail.  Whereas Von Hippel 
distinguishes manufacturers and users, the appropriate functional distinction in the 
military case would be formal procurement from defense contractors on the one hand and 
operational uniformed personnel on the other.  This is an ideal distinction, for in reality 
the military employs civilians as well as uniformed personnel, reservists as well as active 
duty, and there are many types of contracting entities ranging from private corporations, 
                                                 
23 Barry R. Posen, “Organizations and Innovation,” MIT Security Studies Program Working Paper (2001) 
24 Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment, Revised Edition (New York, NY: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1965), 21. 
25 Posen, “Organizations and Innovation,” 23. 
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non-profit federally funded research and development corporations (FFRDCs) like 
MITRE and RAND, to government laboratories, workshops, or arsenals.  Nevertheless, 
the idealized functional sources of significant technical innovation can be characterized 
as (1) the formal separation of use and production managed through a detailed 
requirements-based contracting process, and (2) the intimate involvement of technology 
users in the production of technology. 
The acquisition system is a sprawling tangle of regulations, congressional relations, 
military program management, and defense contracting.  While costly and inefficient, the 
system was instrumental to American preeminence during the Cold War, a contest of 
weapons development with the Soviets, rather than production as in WWII.26  It provided 
the U.S. with the large economies of scale needed for sophisticated hardware requiring 
lots of money, space, labor, and time to field; with technical expertise in advanced 
technologies and systems integration; and ensured testing, certification, maintenance, and 
support mechanisms to move from development to operation.  The end of the Cold War, 
however, reduced the threat that justified the system’s extent without, unfortunately, 
much reducing its long-standing costs.27  These costs include the gross inefficiencies and 
potentials for failure or scandal that follow from, on the one hand, rent-seeking within the 
“iron triangle” of congress, defense contractors, and the military,28 and on the other, the 
tremendous uncertainties associated with fielding complex weapon systems in an 
evolving strategic environment.29 
The classic defense industrial problem, drawing on Mancur Olson’s insights about 
the concentration of powerful interests and under-representation of diffuse interests,30 is 
that congressional pork-barrel politics and contractor business interests lead to the 
acquisition of expensive systems the military doesn’t really need.  Procurement can 
unfairly advantage or be captured by contractors.  Formal regulations can limit the entry 
                                                 
26 Harvey M. Sapolsky et al., "Security Lessons From the Cold War," Foreign Affairs vol. 78, no. 4 (1999): 
77-89. 
27  Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry." International 
Security vol. 24, no. 3 (2000): 5-51 
28 Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense Contracting: the Iron Triangle (New York, NY: Council on 
Economic Priorities, 1981) 
29 Rosen, Winning the Next War 
30 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Second Edition 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) 
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of competitors by restricting users to the certified “program of record” and prohibiting 
other solutions—including user innovations—as unapproved, untested, or unsafe.  In the 
process, the bureaucratic identities of military program managers and technical officers 
(aircraft maintenance officers, computer systems officers, etc.) can lead them to 
unwittingly champion a specific contractor solution.  A “follow-on imperative” can lead 
Congress to generate projects just to “keep the lines warm” in case of national 
emergency.31  Savvy contractors can abet all these processes by becoming more adept at 
navigating the procurement bureaucracy than servicing end-user needs; that is, it may be 
more lucrative to prioritize a core competency in regulatory rent-seeking over defense 
technology production.  A more subtle version of Olson’s logic is the under-
representation of end-users: formal requirements originate within service acquisition 
staffs distinct from operational units, with often little more than lip service to the needs of 
the “war fighter,” resulting in expensive systems ill suited to actual end user needs.   
Furthermore, the complicated acquisition system generates staggering bargaining and 
coordination costs.  Bureaucratic politics (including interservice rivalry, Joint service 
logrolling, and reform attempts) consumes time and money, potentially leading to threat 
inflation, capability duplication, and “gold plating.”32  Contractors spend on lobbying and 
marketing in glossy defense journals and industry conferences, and the government 
spends on oversight and legal services.  Accurate requirements are hard to get because 
busy users who are deployed around the world will not immediately benefit their current 
mission by taking time to articulate long-term requirements, and their task knowledge is 
tacit and situated anyway, thus hard to formalize, while actual input usually comes from 
staff officers echelons above and at least a tour away from operational reality.  
Furthermore, funding is slaved to the Congressional budget cycle, and even the most 
accurate requirements are subject to change because the evolution of technological and 
strategic environments is unpredictable in detail.  
Simply coordinating thousands of engineers and managers spread across programs, 
subcontractors, and geographical locations makes for interminable meetings, 
                                                 
31 James R. Kurth, "The Political Economy of Weapons Procurement: the Follow-On Imperative," The 
American Economic Review vol. 62, no. 1 (1972): 304-311 
32 Thomas L. McNaugher, “Weapons Procurement: the Futility of Reform,” in America's Defense, ed. 
Michael Mandelbaum (New York, NY: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1989), 68-112. 
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management procedures, and perpetual PowerPoint presentations.  The peculiarities of 
software further exacerbate these costs.  Brooks’ 1975 software engineering classic, The 
Mythical Man Month, points out that software, being nearly “pure thought stuff,” is 
irreducibly: complex because abstract components allow for a vast number of states and 
non-linear interaction; difficult to visualize because high-dimensional logical abstractions 
have no one natural representation; changeable because incremental improvements are 
always tractable and the runtime context is highly variable; and arbitrary because 
functionality is intimately tied to evolving domain-specific user interactions.  As a result, 
software projects are unusually susceptible to getting stuck in a “tar pit” of problems that 
read uncannily like a description of government projects: late, over-budget, over-
managed, plagued with communications problems, out of touch with users, difficult to 
update, difficult to maintain, disappointing, frustrating.  His whimsical summary is 
“Brooks’ Law: Adding manpower to a late software project makes it later.”33  Ciborra 
similarly observes that “Ethnographic research about the implementation and use of 
information technology suggests that quite often even in large organizations: leadership is 
missing; and the technology is drifting, as if out of control.”34 
These inefficiencies collectively add up to large transaction costs for defining new 
requirements and turning them into usable technology.  User innovation theory would 
expect that motivated, technically savvy personnel would rather just design things 
themselves if possible.  Drawing on tacit, situated understandings of their own 
requirements, clarity of purpose gained through actual mission performance, and their 
own technical skill, personnel in low-cost niches might realize immediate, small-scale 
operational improvements by innovating with locally available resources.  Especially 
with information processing tasks, stereotyped organizational routines can be offloaded 
onto software programs, providing relatively quick returns to user-developers in terms of 
error reduction, standardization, and time saved for other tasks that computers can’t do, 
such as training, thinking through contingencies, and anticipating the behavior of enemies 
                                                 
33 Frederick P. Brooks, The Mythical Man Month: Essays on Software Engineering, 20th Anniversary 
Edition (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1995), 232. 
34  Ciborra, The Labyrinths of Information, 21.  The Standish Group’s 1994 CHAOS report 
(http://www.standishgroup.com/sample_research/chaos_1994_1.php) estimated that out of a total of $255 
billion spent annually on software, $140 billion was wasted, including $80 billion outright from failed 
projects; 31.1% of projects were canceled, while 52.7% cost 189% their original estimates. 
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and allies.  Immediate gratification, pride in the creation, and the opportunity to assist 
comrades in similar situations would provide positive feedback to the inventor, 
encouraging free-revealing and ongoing refinement by the user community. 
While these are the familiar expected benefits within user innovation theory, there 
are unfortunately also some limitations and pitfalls that the theory doesn’t dwell on.  
While present in many organizations, they loom especially large in militaries.  Personnel 
can be legally directed or prohibited to use a particular technology or procedure by their 
chain of command, which will tend to favor tested and certified solutions over user 
expedients.  For example, all software on military computers is supposed to be tested and 
certified by configuration managers in an attempt to control security and interoperability 
externalities that could result from amateur or malicious software.  This constrains the 
size of the sandbox in which users can play, incidentally leading to many user-developed 
applications being disguised as Office documents since more powerful programming 
packages are not part of the certified configuration.   
Coordination problems emerge when users don’t have the time, ability, or inclination 
to standardize and support their inventions.  Personnel rotate through jobs frequently, 
remaining in a given position at most only a couple of years.  Combat attrition might, 
furthermore, eliminate the sole expert.  Militaries are always uncomfortable about 
depending on only one or a few individuals’ tacit expertise, so they strive to either 
institutionalize or avoid idiosyncratic practices.  Institutionalization, however, is difficult.  
Users invent things expecting to gain some immediate benefit in their job, leveraging 
tacit knowledge of that job gained through active experience.  Writing good 
documentation and training plans—the challenge of making tacit knowledge explicit—is 
often a secondary consideration that does not provide the immediate fun and payoff that 
design does.  So even though frequent rotation may provide a diffusion channel for user 
inventions, it also frustrates long-term support for them.  Frequent changes of jobs may 
also make it harder to establish stable user innovation communities.   
Military user-developers have “day jobs,” an operational task to focus on, and they 
are evaluated for their competency in this area, not software development.  An aviator’s 
career depends on flying not programming.  Technology design is not considered a core 
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war-fighting skill, so superiors and peers are likely to see development and support of 
technical innovations as a distraction from a member’s long-term career interest.  This 
severely curtails the time available for maintenance and support.  A final coordination 
problem is that low-cost components that users incorporate into their solutions may be 
dependent on external commercial support, which could dry up if a company goes out of 
business or discontinues a model, leaving the organization in the lurch. 
The fact that military information systems handle classified data further advantages 
bureaucratic control.  When an application carries the imprimatur of formal certification, 
it shifts the risk from local managers to the certifying agency.  Managers will resist 
bearing the risk of security violations or corruption of mission-critical data that might 
result from informal user innovation.  This is likely to result in the over-protection of risk 
by legitimate managerial authority with respect to the more diffuse benefits of user-
experimentation. 35   How much worse for informal improvisation, therefore, when 
security and interoperability risks are combined? 
This long list of problems and potential negative externalities associated with user 
innovation partially justifies some of the regulation clogging military system 
management and procurement bureaucracies.  The situation is thus that inefficiencies of 
formal acquisition encourage user innovation, while the risks of user innovation justify 
formal program management.  Table 1 summarizes the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of each mode of production. 
                                                 
35 A similar dilemma confronts the intelligence field: counter-intelligence protections (e.g., investigating 
applicants, controlling data) can be over-provided because the risks of a single mole are quite salient 
compared to the diffuse benefits of informal intelligence sharing among analysts. 
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Table 1: Relative strengths and weaknesses of the functional sources of military innovation 
 User Development Formal Procurement 
Strengths Clarity of purpose, enthusiasm 
Tacit/situated knowledge 
Low-cost solution 
Immediate marginal improvement 
Free revealing, informal diffusion, 
increasing returns 
Economies of scale (time, manpower, 
money) 
Technical expertise 
Lifecycle/configuration management  
Bureaucratic legitimacy 
Weaknesses Negative externalities (security, 
reliability, configuration) 
Coordination problems 
(documentation, training, 
scalability, maintenance) 
Resource constraints (brief tenure, 
other job responsibilities, 
technical regulations, 
undercapitalization) 
Under-representation of diffuse user 
interests 
Formal requirements out of touch 
with operational reality 
(uncertainty, ambiguity, budget-
cycle reaction time) 
Industrial/congressional rent seeking 
(including marketing, proprietary 
technology) 
Steep bargaining & coordination 
costs (budgeting, contracting, 
requirements-creep/gold-plating, 
management, testing, fielding); 
increasing with “Jointness” 
Anticipating Military User Innovation 
The primary hypothesis of user innovation theory is that relative expectations of 
innovation-related gain among different functional actors determines the functional 
source of innovation.  This implies that variations in expectations should translate into 
variations in the source of innovation.  In the military environment, expectations will 
result from a combination of the above considerations.  The challenge in any particular 
case is to understand how changing supply and demand side factors affect this complex 
balance.   
All things being equal, changes in the properties of technology or user knowledge 
that lower barriers to entry should promote user development.  Rapid technological 
change or strategic uncertainty should exacerbate the weaknesses of formal procurement, 
contributing to unmet demand and growing transaction costs for dealing with acquisition 
systems, encouraging user development.  User innovation theory furthermore expects that 
lead users (who are the first to experience needs in an emerging market, and are poised to 
 16
benefit from finding a solution) will be the ones to innovate; that they will freely reveal 
solutions to other users; and that they will form distributed innovation communities to 
realize increasing returns.   
Conversely, the inability of user-developers to overcome the risks—real or 
perceived—of informal production should strengthen formal procurement.  Unchecked 
configuration management bureaucracies can be expected to become more adept over 
time at anticipating and identifying weaknesses in user development and suppressing it.  
The bureaucratic politics theoretical perspective,36 with respect to technology acquisition, 
would expect the procurement system to (1) maintain the essential distinction between 
user and producer, (2) to reduce uncertainty through formal program management, (3) to 
increase resources for formal programs, and (4) to enhance autonomy by defining 
programs within well-understood boundaries. 
These contrasting expectations highlight the importance of organizational context for 
military user innovation.  Although user innovation theory describes ways that changes in 
the supply of or demand for technology might promote user innovation, military 
bureaucracy can be expected to stiffly resist movement to a new equilibrium.  User 
innovations in the face of organizational resistance could give rise to a wide range of 
outcomes.  Most likely would be suppression or withering on the vine, with inventions 
abandoned when the inventor transfers.  The minimal level of organizational support 
would be co-optation into existing bureaucratic processes, since less organizational 
change would be required for procurement managers to simply treat user prototypes as 
aberrant sources of requirements for formal procurement projects.  This may be 
inadequate, however, if the conditions which favored user development over formal 
procurement in the first place persist; that is, if cooptation does not reduce unmet demand 
and transaction costs.  More creative (and thus less likely) organizational effort would be 
required to support ongoing user innovations in that case.  Whereas user innovation 
communities seem to arise somewhat spontaneously in Von Hippel’s commercial 
                                                 
36 Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 1974), 
James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 1989), Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (New York, NY: Longman, 1999) 
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examples, determined military user-developers will have to work hard to find a way to 
incubate inventions and build organizational support for a user community.  Significant 
bureaucratic maneuvering to support innovation is not included in the original 
presentation of user innovation theory. 
Testing Theory with FalconView 
The history of aviation mission planning software provides a natural laboratory to 
examine military user innovation.  It spans two decades during which both the 
technological and strategic environments changed rapidly: the commercial PC-based 
information technology sector exploded, and the U.S. military became involved in a wide 
range of operations after the Cold War.  Thus barriers to software production fell while 
warfighting problems changed, providing large variation on user innovation theory’s 
independent variables that influence relative user and manufacturer expectations of gain.   
At the same time this case has factors that appear to favor both users and formal 
acquisition.  On the one hand, aviation is a technology-intensive activity that non-aviators 
never fully understand in detail; aircrew are technically savvy, their education often 
beginning with an undergraduate engineering degree and continuing with extensive 
specialized military training; and aircrew are responsible for their own intricate pre-flight 
planning.  Thus, the technological environment, aircrew knowledge, and user 
accountability for mission planning all promote informal innovation.  On the other hand, 
aviation is a tremendous capital investment for an organization and requires a 
sophisticated defense industrial base to support.  Mishaps are costly, not only because an 
aircraft and its aircrew represent significant investments, but also because crashes and 
weapon delivery errors create high collateral damage costs.  Large risks make testing, 
certification, maintenance, safety, standardization, and oversight important, and this 
empowers formal institutions.  Military aviation is thus a domain with potential for user 
innovation, but also with formidable bureaucratic structure.   
During this time traditionally procured systems evolved side by side with informal 
user efforts.  This interaction generated important consequences for the larger military 
community, including the emergence of a software application called FalconView that 
subsequently became the de facto standard for digital mapping across the U.S. 
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Department of Defense (to include ground forces, special operations, intelligence, as well 
as manned and unmanned aviation).  By providing personnel in all services with an 
intuitive and inexpensive digital mapping package that improved planning efficiency and 
promoted interoperability and adaptability, FalconView was a technical innovation in its 
own right, but more importantly it also involved organizational innovation.  FalconView 
enthusiasts introduced a different way of developing military software, involving 
operational users in technical production, and providing tools and support for on-going, 
decentralized adaptation to novel situations.   
During the past decade, operational users drove FalconView development and 
diffusion far beyond its initial scope as an F-16 mission planner, resulting in a versatile 
platform for networked planning and operations, all for a total cost of about $20 million.  
By contrast, the formal software acquisition program inspired by and intended to replace 
FalconView, the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS), remains millions of dollars 
over-budget, years behind schedule, and had yet to field a certified operational version as 
of early 2006.  Over $1 billion will be spent during JMPS’ first decade, to say nothing of 
the opportunity costs associated with acquisition practices ill-suited to software 
development.  Even then JMPS will remain an aviation-only program lacking important 
military-wide capabilities that have evolved subsequently in FalconView. 
This narrative covers two general phases of military user innovation and the 
acquisition bureaucracy’s reaction to it.  The first is the emergence of automated mission 
planning for fighter aircraft in the 1980s, culminating with the user-led development of 
FalconView in the 1990s.  The second phase is user innovation activity that builds upon 
FalconView as a foundation as it diffuses to military communities beyond fighter aviation.  
Through historical process tracing it should be possible to examine whether technical and 
strategic variation catalyzes user innovation in the ways user innovation theory expects—
by altering relative expectations of gain, empowering lead users, and supporting 
innovation communities—or whether the idiosyncratic bureaucratic context plays a more 
important role in explaining this case.  As mentioned above, a case can be made for the 
strength of both influences in the military aviation domain. 
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Sources for this history include interviews and correspondence with key participants, 
identified through interviewee referrals, official and unofficial primary source documents, 
either in the public domain or provided to the author by participants, and the author’s 
experience using FalconView while an active-duty naval officer.  Several interviewees 
played a key role in both formal and informal programs—an important fact about this 
case, as discussed further below—and so were in a good position to report reliably on 
events; this helps mitigate against a potential pro-FalconView bias in the interview 
sample. 
Automated Mission Planning 
Aviation mission planning includes all of the information gathering, processing, and 
production aircrew must do before take-off.  Simply a cross-country flight requires 
aviators to: find proper charts; update the status and frequencies of airfields and 
navigation aids; create a communications plan; compute aircraft-specific preflight and 
flight performance data; file a flight plan; gather weather data; calculate fuel 
consumption; and generate knee-board cards summarizing this data and strip-charts (chart 
segments for the entire route).  An attack mission is even more involved, including all of 
the above plus: parsing the air tasking order from higher headquarters; target area study 
with imagery; weaponeering calculations; weapons load-out planning; air-refueling 
planning; aircraft formation and friendly ground force deconfliction; threat intelligence 
and analysis; avoidance and suppression of enemy air defenses; and combat search and 
rescue planning.  Different missions have different planning requirements, such as slow-
down points and computed air-release points for the C-130 airdrop mission.  Some 
missions require more effort than others.   
Prior to automated mission planning systems, these calculations were a time-
consuming activity involving paper charts, protractors, dividers, whiz wheels, grease 
pencils, flight manuals, and paper orders and updates.  Turn radii were traced around 
coins, strings pulled across charts to measure distances, and strip charts cut with scissors 
and glued together.  It was not unusual to find some of these practices ongoing in some 
squadrons as late as the mid-1990s. 
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In the late 1970s, aviators were experimenting with automating some of these tasks 
using microcomputers and engineering calculators, just then becoming available in the 
commercial market.  The first mass-produced microcomputers—the Apple II, Tandy 
Radio Shack TRS-80, and Commodore PET (Personal Electronic Transactor)—appeared 
in 1977.  The IBM PC, running Microsoft DOS, followed in 1981.  Hundreds of new 
firms with no connection to the existing corporate software industry sprang up, and the 
software industry’s growth curve turned sharply upward in what one historian describes 
as a gold rush.  Some of the most successful products for microcomputers at that time—
the VisiCalc spreadsheet, WordStar word processor, dBase II database—were written on 
microcomputers by groups of just one or two programmers.37 
Just as these affordable machines opened up a whole new commercial market, they 
created similar new opportunities for military aviators.  “Mission planning is not rocket 
science,” one aviator explained, “but it’s complicated with lots of moving parts.” 38  
Because many of the computations performed manually were well standardized, they 
were ideal candidates for a computer algorithm.  Programming computers to perform oft-
repeated and stereotyped calculations essentially off-loads the computational burden onto 
the machine, reducing errors, saving time, and freeing humans to focus on other “moving 
parts,” especially more intangible considerations about mission scenarios or enemy 
actions that are ill-suited to an algorithm.39  In the late 1970s and early 80s, it was both 
feasible and natural for military aviators, often electronics enthusiasts in their spare time, 
to obtain microcomputers with their own money and begin writing software to aid 
mission planning. 
A Tale of Two Systems: PC and Unix 
Two young A-10 pilots, Captain Jake Thorn and Captain Jerry Fleming, were 
stationed at Mertle Beach Air Force Base in 1981.  The two were avid electronics 
hobbyists and HAM radio operators who began writing software on a TRS-80 Model 1.  
The commander of Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC), General Wilbur L. Creech, 
                                                 
37 Martin Campbell-Kelly, From Airline Reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog: A History of the Software 
Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 202-221. 
38 Jake Thorn, interview by author (13 October 2005). 
39 Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Frank Levy and Richard J. 
Murnane, The New Division of Labor (Princeton University Press and the Russell Sage Foundation, 2004) 
 21
met the pair during a routine visit and was favorably impressed, asking, “Can you flight 
plan on that thing?”  Thorn assured him that he could and was invited to give a 
demonstration in a month’s time at a Corona meeting of Air Force general officers.  The 
Captains’ squadron commanding officer agreed to take them off the flight schedule so 
they could get to work.  The result was “Jake and Jerry’s Two Week Flight Planner,” 
which impressed the crowd enough that Creech created the TAC Small Computer 
Program to provide every TAC squadron with a microcomputer and begin “squadron 
automation.” 40 
TAC purchased Cromemco System 2 (CS-2) machines, providing some minimal 
infrastructure for every TAC squadron to be able to write and run its own software.41  
Various aviator-written programs percolated throughout the community, passed around 
on floppy disks from one aviator to another as they commuted around air bases, an 
effective form of pre-internet software diffusion.  One program that became widely used 
was FPLAN (“Flight Planner”), first written in 1983 by Thorn and Fleming together with 
another aviator, Captain J. C. Thompson, at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.  FPLAN 
performed basic route and fuel calculations, but its real strength was an updatable 
database of navigation coordinates and frequencies from the Instrument Flight Rules 
(IFR) supplement.  Like a garage-start-up software company, the officers’ wives 
manually typed in the data from each update so they could make copies on floppy disks 
and mail them out to other aviators.  Over the next several years, they released several 
new versions of FPLAN updates on the side while working other primary jobs, and the 
update distribution list grew considerably.  FPLAN found its way onto computers of 
squadrons across the Air Force and Air National Guard.42 
                                                 
40 Thorn, interview (13 October 2005).  General Creech later asked Thorn, “If I wanted to see flight 
planning when I first visited, could I?”  Thorn answered, “No sir, but I knew I could do it in a month,” 
displaying a risk-accepting optimism common among user-developers.  “I thought so,” replied Creech. 
41 Interestingly, IBM did not submit a bid for the TAC contract, and as a result squadrons had CS2s rather 
than PCs until 1987.  They were stuck with the CS-2 long after the commercial market had embraced the 
PC, foreshadowing the tendency of military IT infrastructure to lag behind the commercial state of the art.  
TAC also let a contract to Atlantic Analysis Corporation to design some basic mission-planning software 
for the CS-2, but this withered away from neglect as aircrew used their own programs. 
42 Thorn, interview (13 October 2005) 
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FPLAN’s emergence at Eglin is significant because in 1983, TAC established a 
center for testing and evaluating automated mission planning systems there.43  This meant 
that FPLAN emerged from the one location where contractor-produced mission planning 
systems also first entered the force.  In a pattern that would repeat itself, the same 
aviators involved with official systems were also developing unofficial systems on the 
side, having both strong interests in mission planning as well as inside knowledge of the 
problems plaguing the official effort.  These first official solutions, interestingly enough, 
also used the CS-2 platform, but they ran a Unix operating system while the squadron 
machines ran a version of DOS.  The first Mission Support System (MSS I) included a 
digitizer table “big enough to double as a bomb shelter,” on which a paper chart could be 
overlaid and coordinates registered with a mouse-like pointing device, enabling some 
very basic geometric calculations to be performed.44  MSS I had a lot of problems and 
was difficult to use as delivered, leading to a complete software overhaul at Eglin in 
1983.45  Captain Thorn was the Operations Officer of the 4485th Test Squadron at Eglin 
where MSS I was in Operational Test, during the same time he was working on 
FPLAN.46 
MSS II followed in 1986, an even larger refrigerator-sized minicomputer system 
enclosed in its own ruggedized container that needed four people to lift it and a C-130 to 
transport it.47  Aircrew preferred to use FPLAN and other informal programs whenever 
possible to avoid MSS II.  To be sure, MSS II had capabilities the informal software did 
not.  These included some of the first digital map displays, which necessitated Unix 
minicomputers because PC microcomputers were still too underpowered at that time.48  
More importantly, MSS II was needed to load a data transfer cartridge (DTC), a “brick” 
                                                 
43 Jake Thorn, Mission Planning History Slides (2005). 
44 Thorn, interview (13 October 2005) 
45 Mike Bartgis, “AFMSS MPS and PFPS News,” ANG/DOOM Newsletter (May 2000), 6. 
46 Thorn, interview (13 October 2005) 
47 John Pyles, correspondence with author (26 October 2005).  The MSS II actually consisted of two 
computers in the same ruggedized mil-spec container, a MicroVAX for map image processing and a 
Cromemco S-100 bus, a holdover from MSS I. 
48 John Pyles, interview with author (28 October 2005).  These maps were CIA World Databank II vector 
(“stick”) maps at the 1:500k-1:1M scale, as well as some Common Mapping System (CMS) raster 
(“picture”) maps scanned from aviation charts.  The British firm Fairchild Defense supplied the original 
MSS raster maps, prompting the Air Force to develop its own CMS scanning and encoding format to 
escape foreign dependence.  At a 12:1 compression, this format required a lot of storage and graphics 
power, so PCs were not even an option in the 1980s. 
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which was loaded by mission planning computers in squadron operations centers and 
then plugged into a jet on the flight line.   
The advent of improved capability aircraft with onboard computers to aid navigation 
and weapons delivery was a major factor increasing demand for mission planning 
software.  The F-16C, fielded in 1981, had improved avionics and the first data cartridge.  
With only a 8Kb capacity at first, these could be programmed in the cockpit in a pinch, 
but by 1990 capacity had grown to 128Kb, and there were some things that could only be 
done on an MSS II.49  As more aircraft were fitted with data cartridges, MSS-II was 
expanded to cover other TAC aircraft, raising coordination costs considerably for 
program managers. 
Unfortunately, not all squadrons with F-16Cs had an MSS II, and those that did 
found them difficult to move, use and maintain.  Air National Guard (ANG) squadrons 
were particularly hard pressed on both accounts, being well below active duty squadrons 
in priority for new equipment, and needing to be as portable as possible for deployments.  
This led ANG Major Walter Sobczyk and Major Robert Sandford to set out to build a 
device that would hook up directly with a PC and load the cartridge.  The first prototype 
was literally carved out of wood at Hill Air Force Base in Ogden, Utah, and dubbed the 
“Ogden Data Device” (ODD).  The design was refined in-house at the Ogden Air 
Logistics Center, and soon ODDs and PCs running FPLAN were available to ANG 
aircrew, eliminating the need for MSS II for the bulk of F-16 planning needs.   
ODDs crept into active duty squadrons, provoking the ire of TAC, which perceived 
them as unsafe and a threat to MSS II, even though aircrew found them to actually be 
more reliable and hassle-free than MSS II.50  Major Sandford—who carried business 
cards with the slogan “Fly fast, fight dirty, and cheat when necessary”—championed the 
ODD in both ANG and active duty channels.51  Officers and squadron commanders were 
willing to ignore TAC protests and use the preferred ODD/FPLAN solution.  This reflects 
a tradition of aircrew responsibility for performing their own planning, but also a degree 
                                                 
49 Mark A. Gillott, “Breaking the Mission Planning Bottleneck: A New Paradigm,” Air University Air 
Command and Staff College Research Report AU/ACSC/099/1998-04 (1998), 4-6. 
50 Pyles, correspondence (26 October 2005) 
51 Mike Bartgis, interview with author (28 October 2005) 
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of autonomy for TAC fighter squadrons that might not exist, for instance, in Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) bomber squadrons equipped with nuclear weapons. 
The popularity of PC solutions among aircrew led TAC to direct in 1989 that MSS II 
mimic the FPLAN interface, and that further programs developed for the Unix MSS II 
also be concurrently developed for the PC;52 basically, user innovations were influencing 
requirements for formal systems.  At this time, having just returned from a tour with the 
Air Force Thunderbirds, now Major Jake Thorn was the Chief of the Tactical Air Force 
Mission Support System Projects Office at Eglin.53  Again this individual was a key link 
in the interaction between the formal Unix and informal PC efforts, managing Air Force 
spending on the former while still participating in the development and distribution of the 
latter himself.  Although working to improve the formal systems, he was painfully aware 
of the problems plaguing their development and the importance of ensuring operators had 
something that worked well in the mean time.  These twin paths—official, expensive, 
something-for-everyone, difficult-to-mange Unix solutions, versus informal, run-on-a-
shoestring, mission-focused, PC solutions—would characterize mission-planning 
software throughout the 1990s. 
The 1991 Gulf War provided a major stimulus to automated mission planning.  
Averaging 2,697 sorties per day for 43 days, the war subjected tactics and equipment to a 
rigorous “live fire operational test and evaluation.”54  Many aircrew were exposed to 
digital mapping and imagery on the MSS II for the first time and found that it could 
reduce both planning time and errors.  However, there were never enough to go around, 
and the machines were frequently down.  Many squadrons did not have an MSS II, and 
the ones that did had only one to go around for two-dozen jets.  Many squadrons lacked 
even PCs.  Manual planning with paper charts and grease pencils was still common.  
Mission planning took at least six to eight hours and sometimes days for complex strikes; 
target imagery and intelligence was often unavailable; coordination with widely dispersed 
                                                 
52 Gillott, “Breaking the Mission Planning Bottleneck,” 7. 
53 Jake Thorn, military biography page (2005) 
54 Richard J. Blanchfield et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume 4 (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1993), 88, 153-170; Lewis D. Hill et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume 5 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 234. 
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members of strike packages was very difficult; and coordination with friendly ground 
forces sometimes impossible.55 
The war highlighted the importance of improving automated mission planning.  The 
Air Force established a System Program Office at the Electronic Systems Center (ESC) 
to create a common planning system called Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS).  
With a much more ambitious scope than TAC’s already broad MSS II effort, AFMSS 
was supposed to provide planning capability for fighter, bomber, airlift, tanker, and 
special operations aircraft, as well as headquarters command and control.  This effort to 
make “something for everyone” at one go would prove quite frustrating for users and 
managers alike, as the expense and coordination challenges tended to separate engineers 
and users with many layers of bureaucracy.56  The resultant hardware suite, called a 
Mission Planning System (MPS), would be even bigger than the already large MSS II.  
Exacerbating portability and fielding problems, the entire system was classified, even its 
generic navigation functionality, since the system also could display intelligence threat 
data.  The classified segment was used infrequently, in part because supporting 
intelligence organizations and systems were still not well integrated.  By contrast, 
programs like FPLAN had always been unclassified and easy to disseminate.57 
Major Sandford, working on the National Guard Bureau staff in 1992, was 
pessimistic that AFMSS would ever be viable for the Air National Guard (ANG).  Above 
and beyond the design problems he anticipated from the cumbersome contracting process, 
he knew AFMSS MPS would be even less mobile than MSS II, a drawback for deploying 
Guard units, and furthermore, the Guard likely wouldn’t receive them for years after 
                                                 
55 Thomas A Keaney and Eliot A Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary (Washington DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1993), 177-178; Jane Glaser, “When Reflex is a Matter of Life and Death,” 
expanded draft version of chapter 21 in Bill Gates, Business @ the Speed of Thought: Succeeding in the 
Digital Economy (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1999). 
56 AFMSS development exemplified the “gold plating” (also called “requirements creep”) profile described 
by McNaugher, “Weapons Procurement,” 95: “Early optimism about cost, performance, and schedule, 
combined with inflexibility during development itself, makes it virtually inevitable that the services will 
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substantially higher, than was expected.  This calls into question the cost-effectiveness of some of the 
performance called for in the original requirement.  Yet normally little of that performance is sacrificed; 
indeed, performance requirements may be augmented during development.  And by the time information is 
available to inform real cost-effectiveness judgments, the project has acquired a momentum that makes 
cancellation difficult.” 
57 Gillott, “Breaking the Mission Planning Bottleneck,” 8-12. 
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active duty squadrons.  While FPLAN on PCs with ODDs had worked passably as a 
stopgap, FPLAN was nevertheless reaching the limits of its design, with architectural 
legacies dating back to the earliest microcomputers (like single character variables) and 
several ports across different operating systems.   
Sandford envisioned a complete PC alterative, running on a single laptop, displaying 
digital maps, supporting graphical mission planning, and loading cartridges via an ODD.  
Prevailing on ANG staffers, Sandford obtained unallocated year-end money.58 
The Killer App 
An easy-to-use PC mapping program seems like a natural development: there are lots 
of imaginable military, government, commercial, and recreational applications for a fast, 
cheap, PC mapping program; it would seem to have a generic niche like the spreadsheet 
or word processor.  However, nothing arose in the commercial market to fill it like Lotus 
1-2-3 and WordStar did theirs.  For one thing, PCs were viewed as far too underpowered 
to support graphics-intensive mapping.  For another, digital mapping requires digital map 
data, and that requires established encoding and compression standards and detailed, 
regularly updated coverage over a wide area.  What data did exist on the market was 
expensive, and it had to be purchased piecemeal, thus the customers who could afford it 
could also afford a more powerful Unix machine to work with it.  The low-end PC 
mapping market was thus rather undeveloped in the 1980s and early 1990s.59  Sandford’s 
application, however, would be perfectly positioned: military users could get access to 
                                                 
58 Pyles, correspondence (26 October 2005); Robert Sandford, interview with author (12 October 2005).  
The fact that money was available for Sandford’s experiment highlights the role of slack resources in 
innovation.   
Pyles’ notes from a briefing around this time, reportedly by Sandford, read: “If the federal government 
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available over the internet. 
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voluminous map data that was being developed for military mapping applications (on 
Unix platforms), which took care of the latter problem; and PC performance was 
improving by a factor of two every 18 months, so the former problem would take care of 
itself. 
Sandford contacted engineers at MIT, Stanford, and the Georgia Institute of 
Technology about the project.  He received a lot of resistance to the idea of doing F-16 
mapping software on a PC, reflecting an engineering bias for choosing more powerful 
Unix systems for graphics-intensive computation.60  Sandford countered that even if PCs 
weren’t fast enough then, they would be soon enough, probably by the time the software 
was written.  He foresaw correctly that Unix minicomputers would remain scarce, 
expensive assets for squadrons, while PCs running Microsoft software would only 
become more readily available and accessible.  In spring 1993, Sandford found a 
sympathetic ear at the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI), the non-profit applied 
research arm of the university, in a research scientist named John Pyles.  While a 
graduate student at GTRI, Pyles had worked on some Army intelligence software that 
displayed photographs of maps on PCs, which he saw had great advantages of portability 
and usefulness in the field, as well as on a MSS-II project where he became familiar with 
military map data formats.61  Like other engineers, Pyles wanted to do Sandford’s project 
in Unix, even a PC running Unix, but Sandford was adamant that FalconView would be a 
PC DOS-based program.  Pyles recruited two more GTRI graduate students onto the team, 
Robert Gue and Vincent Solicito.62   
The contract was signed in September for a “Flight Plan Simulation Mapping 
System,” with the word “simulation” added so that the ANG could piggy-back on an 
existing Army Research Labs contract with GTRI for simulation software.  This allowed 
them to bypass the hassle, delay, and expense of establishing a new contract.  GTRI 
                                                 
60 Sandford, interview (12 October 2005).  The engineering resistance was understandable.  Not only were 
Unix machines pervasive in scientific and engineering environments, many attempts by large corporations 
to create graphics-heavy windows operating systems for the PC had failed.  Only with the release of 
Microsoft Windows 3.0 in 1991 had the software matured enough and PCs sped up enough to make 
graphical windows based programs really feasible (Campbell-Kelly, From Airline Reservations to Sonic the 
Hedgehog, 250-251).  
61 Pyles, correspondence (26 October 2005) 
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managers also required Pyles to phrase the wording of the contract so that deliverables 
would be “beta”—working prototypes rather than finished product—because they felt the 
6-month deadline was too ambitious.  “We…were just too naïve to realize this ourselves 
and just went ahead and finished the initial release anyway,” Pyles recalls, “Being fresh 
out of college, $475K sure sounded like a lot of money to us and as a result we were 
under a good deal of self-induced pressure to deliver.”  The beta version was completed 
in January 1994, and a tested version 1.01 was released to F-16 aircrew in June.63   
FalconView is essentially a digital version of the classic military map board with 
transparent overlays (e.g., one for terrain features, another for enemy disposition, another 
for friendly scheme of maneuver, etc.).  Presented in a familiar Microsoft Office style 
with buttons, menus, and a large graphical workspace, FalconView could display a wide 
variety of maps and imagery at different scales;64 its custom overlays could be saved and 
shared as small files;65 it included a connection for hand-held GPS receivers and a real-
time moving map display; and also a tactical radio feed to display intelligence data and 
                                                 
63 John Pyles, correspondence with author (7 December 2005).  The fresh-out-of-college naivety expressed 
itself in other ways, too.  Someone on the FalconView team included a copy of the video game Doom on 
the CD with version 1.0.  Doom remained on the CD for three years until a squadron intelligence officer 
called GTRI and told them he was having trouble getting FalconView on his machines because security 
managers told him Doom wasn’t accredited (Pyles, interview). 
64 Users can pan around and zoom in and out through different scales of maps and imagery while the 
overlays move and scale with them.  Moving the cursor over the map provides coordinates and elevation 
accurate enough to slew optical sensors onto a target.  Map, image, and elevation data generally is loaded 
from CD-ROMs provided by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA, formerly known as the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, NIMA) onto local hard-drives or network servers.  Greater area 
coverage, especially at large scales and with imagery, can require a lot of storage, so users generally only 
load up data they need, although deployable map servers with terabytes of data are now available.  Maps 
were CMS for FalconView 1.0, CDARG by 2.0.  The smallest scale available at that time was 1:250,000 
scale Joint Operational Graphic (JOG) charts; 1:50,000 terrain land maps and 1:25,000 city graphics are 
now available for selected areas.  FalconView now also can display USGS and NOAA GeoTIFF and 
Digital Nautical Chart (DNC) formats, and users can geo-rectify their own custom-scanned imagery.  
Imagery was initially SPOT.  Now unclassified commercial satellite Controlled Image Base (CIB) is 
available at 10 meter resolution world-wide, many places at 5 meter, and selected areas at 1 meter.   
65  There are different kinds of overlays: routes, threats with range rings, local points for targets and 
navigation aids, and free-form vector drawings for airspace annotation.  Each overlay is saved as a small 
file, somewhat like an Office “document,” so it can easily be moved via floppy disk or email.  The 
separation of generic map data from mission-specific overlay files helped not only in data and storage 
management, but also in keeping FalconView itself and the basic map data unclassified.  FalconView could 
be run on a classified PC and thus manipulate classified overlay data, while all development could remain 
unclassified.  This gave FalconView a tremendous advantage over AFMSS MSS and TAMPS (which could 
only be operated in a classified environment), making it easier to disseminate without classification 
controls, and available to user groups with limited security clearance, such as many allies. 
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friendly force locations.66  “We knew it would be a really cool app if anyone would let us 
build it,” said Pyles.  Furthermore, the constraint of designing for the Intel 80486 
processor (rather than a more powerful minicomputer) in 1994 forced GTRI engineers to 
come up with fast and efficient rendering techniques.  Although this constraint 
evaporated as PC hardware performance improved, it paid dividends later on in fast, 
smooth performance.  “I knew technology was on our side and we could ride the 
hardware wave of hard disks, screen resolution, and PC performance improvement,” 
Pyles said.67  AFMSS engineers wedded to Unix solutions did not appreciate that, as 
Sandford pointed out, “PCs are disposable.”  
Sandford and Pyles consciously based FalconView management on Frederick 
Brooks’ The Mythical Man-Month.68  Brooks argues that conceptual integrity is the most 
important and elusive part of software design (which, as mentioned above, is 
characterized by complexity, non-visibility, changeability, and arbitrariness) and this is 
best achieved with a “surgical team” having fewer, higher quality programmers, a chief 
programmer controlling the concepts, and frequent end-user interaction to ensure that the 
task and solution are coordinated.  Pyles played the role of chief programmer, while 
Sandford articulated user requirements and remained closely involved in architecture and 
interface discussions, sometimes even coding working software to convey a concept.  
Although a staff officer at the National Guard Bureau, Sandford was still flying regularly 
(a practice since disallowed for Pentagon staff officers), so his understanding of planning 
requirements was kept fresh.69   
Developing an effective human interface is difficult for engineers to accomplish 
working only from formal requirements and lacking an intuitive understanding of the user 
situation, a situation common in formal acquisition programs.  By contrast, FalconView 
developers made the interface a priority.  Two early decisions were particularly important.  
First, they bet on Microsoft: “it will be whatever Bill Gates decides.”  This meant 
designing for DOS and later Windows, writing in the C++ language rather than ADA (the 
                                                 
66 These feeds were not added in the initial F-16 version because the aircraft already had a map display 
built into the cockpit, but they were some of the first modifications in version 2.0. 
67 Pyles, interview. 
68 Sandford, interview (12 October 2005). 
69 Mike Bartgis, correspondence with author (28 October 2005) 
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Department of Defense standard at the time), and adopting the interface “look and feel” 
of Microsoft Office applications in order to make it easier for users already familiar with 
Office to learn FalconView.70  They gave a lot of attention to the graphical user interface 
because they wanted a novice user to be productive with daily tasks right away.  In stark 
contrast to MSS and AFMSS MPS, which required users to memorize cryptic 
combinations of keyboard commands, FalconView became an application that people like 
to play with the first time they’re first exposed to it.  As one aviator commented, “I’ve 
learned more in 10 minutes on my own with this software than I did during two weeks of 
training on the MPS.”71  
Second, version 1.0 would be designed only for F-16 mission planning (hence the 
name “FalconView” after the F-16 “Fighting Falcon”).  Even though there was interest in 
Sandford’s project elsewhere, especially the C-130 lift community, he wanted to avoid 
the kind of requirements creep that plagued MSS-II and AFMSS, which in trying to be all 
things for all aircraft delivered poor solutions to everyone at great expense.  Sandford and 
Pyles supposed from the start that FalconView could be broadly useful for other aircraft, 
instructor stations in simulators, and non-aviation users, so a challenge would be holding 
theses other communities at bay.72  They felt it was essential to first achieve success with 
the basics: “do only 80%, but do it perfect.”73  This would set a precedent for small 
incremental changes in FalconView, always making sure that basic functionality was 
solid before trying to add more, and willing to be flexible on deadlines to do so (an 
informal convenience the large programs didn’t share).  By focusing on the human 
interface rather than just technical functionality, and by limiting the initial scope to the F-
16, Sandford and Pyles laid the foundation for an application that others—and not only 
aircrew—would find intuitively attractive.   
Growing Pains 
FalconView development encountered resistance right from the beginning.  While 
friction between FalconView and its programmatic competitors might be expected, there 
                                                 
70 Joe Webster, interview with author (25 October 2005) 
71 Gillott, “Breaking the Mission Planning Bottleneck,” 15. 
72 Webster, interview. 
73 Sandford, interview (12 October 2005) 
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was also chafing between proponents of different user efforts, reminiscent of the 
squabbling that can erupt among insurgent factions.  In particular, Major Sandford and 
Major Thorn developed different opinions about the relationship between user-led 
software efforts and the formal programs.  Sandford was exasperated with the 
inefficiency of MSS and AFMSS, and just as he had pioneered the stand-alone ODD-
FPLAN solution, he sought to bypass the programs altogether with an independently 
funded Air National Guard (ANG) system.  Thorn, by contrast, who had been officially 
involved with MSS-II management as well as informally nursing FPLAN, saw user 
software efforts as supplementary stopgaps.  Thorn hoped to reform the acquisition 
programs, while the more revolutionary-minded Sandford wanted to avoid them 
altogether.   
The two could at least agree that FPLAN needed to be completely overhauled, 
Sandford because he needed the flight planning capabilities for FalconView’s graphical 
display, and Thorn because a stopgap was needed until the AFMSS Unix solution was 
ready.  The AFMSS program was completely opposed to attempting to display maps on a 
PC, thought to be an unpromising and wasteful distraction from the Unix effort.  
Sandford would thus provide some of his ANG funding for an FPLAN replacement, 
dubbed Combat Flight Planning Software (CFPS), and Thorn would achieve reluctant 
AFMSS acquiescence by promising keeping it separate from FalconView.  CFPS 
development began at Eglin under a contract to the Tybrin Corporation, where Jerry 
Fleming, one of the original FPLAN developers, now worked as a civilian.74  Thorn’s 
DOS-based CFPS would share the same interface with the Unix-based AFMSS systems, 
so they could co-exist, to the point that AFMSS eventually began funding further CFPS 
development.  This also allowed CFPS to leverage Aircraft Weapon Electronics (AWE) 
software, also written at Eglin, to facilitate platform-specific cartridge loading.   
Sandford’s vision for FalconView, in contrast with Thorn, was a threat to the 
AFMSS program.  The first version of FalconView could interface with CFPS, 
effectively providing CFPS with the map display that AFMSS would not allow.  Faced 
with the increasingly capable combination of FalconView, CFPS, and the AWEs—
                                                 
74 Bartgis, “AFMSS MPS and PFPS News,” 6-7; Robert Sandford, interview with author (20 December 
2005) 
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collectively dubbed Portable Flight Planning Software (PFPS)—AFMSS and Thorn tried 
to slow its development.  They demanded that route coordinates entered through CFPS 
remain fixed in FalconView; however, Sandford’s next version allowed users to 
graphically construct and modify a route.  AFMSS also demanded that FalconView not 
be able to build threats, an expensive classified capability of the AFMSS MPS; the next 
version allowed users to graphically build threat overlays, a capability that could remain 
unclassified because the functionality was independent of classified threat data.75   
The FalconView team routinely ignored angry AFMSS protests as they looked into 
adding new features.  They could get away with this for two reasons.  First, the AFMSS 
MPS was encountering a lot of development problems and receiving extremely negative 
user feedback, so even program managers recognized that a functional stopgap really was 
needed.  Although Thorn wanted to see AFMSS succeed, he began to appreciate the 
growing utility and potential of FalconView.  More importantly, however, FalconView 
was shielded from direct AFMSS and active duty Air Force influence by sponsorship by 
the ANG and Air Force Reserve.   
The Reserve, like the Guard, enjoyed a lower AFMSS priority than the active duty 
Air Force, so funding further improvements to FalconView was likewise sensible.  This 
funding was obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Joe Webster, an aviator on the Air Force 
Reserve staff.  Webster took over detailed FalconView management in 1995 when 
Sandford transferred to Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, to head the F-16 Test Team.  
Sandford still spoke frequently with and made monthly visits to GTRI, ensuring that 
FalconView development benefited from immediate user feedback. 76   Reservist 
involvement in FalconView development also opened up an avenue for ideas about 
civilian technology development to enter the military.77    
By early 1996, FalconView version 2.0, a Windows 3.1 application with significantly 
expanded functionality, was percolating throughout the Air Force, aided by Eglin’s 
production of AWEs for more and more different types of aircraft.  A tragedy in Croatia 
further raised its visibility.  On 3 April, an Air Force CT-43 (Boeing 737) carrying U.S. 
                                                 
75 Bartgis, “AFMSS MPS and PFPS News,” 7. 
76 Sandford interview (12 October 2005). 
77 Glaser, “When Reflex is a Matter of Life and Death.” 
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Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and 34 others crashed on instrument approach to 
Dubrovnik, killing all aboard (Kozaryn, 1996).78  Air Force investigators opined that had 
the pilots used the FalconView moving map in the cockpit, the controlled flight into 
ground might have been avoided.  Later that year, the Air Force made FalconView use 
mandatory on all Distinguished Visitor aircraft.79   
Frustration with AFMSS mounted and the popularity of FalconView grew, spreading 
informally to an estimated 13,000 users by 1997.80  The issue came to a head at a meeting 
of Air Force general officers at the Pentagon.  The AFMSS Special Program Office 
director was fired, and AFMSS was directed to officially incorporate PFPS, although 
GTRI and Eglin would continue actual development.  AFMSS would still put money into 
MPS because there were some missions and aircraft, such as the F-117 stealth fighter, 
that were dependent on it, but nonetheless PFPS finally had official endorsement, as well 
as $4.4 million of AFMSS money over the next two years.81   
That same year FalconView was recognized as one of five finalists in the “core 
business” category of the Windows Word Open, an annual competition sponsored by 
Microsoft to promote Windows software development;82 Microsoft CEO Bill Gates later 
included a chapter on FalconView in a business book singing the praises of information 
technology.83  By October 1997, GTRI released FalconView 3.0, the first new version 
since FalconView’s victory over AFMSS, updated for the 32-bit Windows 95 operating 
system and including 100-meter Digital Terrain Elevation Data.84  With this version, 
FalconView really began to diffuse beyond its humble origin.   
User innovation theory expects that technological changes that lower barriers-to-
entry for lead users will promote user innovation.  Aviators like Jake Thorn, Jerry 
                                                 
78  Linda D. Kozaryn, “Air Force Releases Brown Crash Investigation Report,” American Forces 
Information Services (13 June 1996), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1996/n06131996_9606132.html. 
79 Chris Bailey, “FalconView: Mission Planning Tools at GTRI,” PowerPoint presentation (2005). 
80 Department of Defense, “Air Reserve Software Program Wins Worldwide Recognition,” Press Release 
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Flemming, and Bobby Sandford fit the lead user profile well: they were interested in 
planning automation well in advance of a larger user population, which discovered the 
same needs incrementally later and then en masse during the Gulf War; and as 
operational aviators, they were positioned to benefit immediately from improving their 
own planning performance.  As computers suddenly became affordable for users’ private 
purchase or for small units’ discretionary budgets, as the theory expects, lead users 
pioneered automated mission planning before formal acquisition programs even existed.  
Only after users proactively demonstrated and disseminated their programs was it clear 
that “market” potential existed, and thus formal programs were initiated.  In the 1980s, 
the formal programs were able to innovate improvements beyond the production capacity 
of users, most notably the first digital maps, which still required Unix minicomputers and 
a determined effort to produce map data.  However, the existence of formal programs did 
not reduce user innovation activity; in fact, the former actually helped expand demand for 
the latter by exposing more users to the benefits of automation, especially during the Gulf 
War, and by imposing the high transaction costs typical of the acquisition requirements 
process.  PC hardware and Microsoft software also continued to improve in capability 
and decline in cost, while formal programs remained wedded to Unix architectures, 
further catalyzing lead user innovation. 
FalconView, nevertheless, was not a pure user innovation.  The code was actually 
written by full-time GTRI contractors, albeit on a not-for-profit basis.  The project 
maintained an intimate working relationship with users from the start, with Sandford and 
later Webster setting design priorities and occasionally coding prototypes to convey an 
idea, and with engineers frequently interacting with operators.  This arrangement had the 
effect of drastically reducing the transaction costs involved in joining user need 
information and technical solution information.  Contractors wrote the code, but 
operational users were very much a part of the conceptual design process, allowing for 
frequent feedbacks with working prototypes somewhat like the software design 
philosophy later popularized as “spiral development.”  While FalconView’s organization 
was quite different than the formalized and bureaucratic processes that procured MSS and 
AFMSS, it’s important to recognize that it still represented a minimal amount of 
infrastructure in terms of a contracting vehicle, permanent facilities, non-rotating 
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technical expertise at GTRI, and progressive insinuation into testing and certification 
regimes.  This put FalconView somewhere between exclusively user innovation and 
traditional defense technology acquisition, which, together with protection from the “big 
blue” Air Force provided by Air National Guard sponsorship, allowed FalconView 
development to capture some of the benefits of user innovation while avoiding its pitfalls 
(as summarized in Table 1).   
Because users had to work partially within the existing acquisition framework to 
realize their desired innovation, one consequence was disagreement among lead users as 
to how far this cooptation should go.  This disagreement would shape the acquisition 
community’s response to the embarrassment of AFMSS and the ascendancy of 
FalconView.  One possibility, advocated by Sandford and Webster, would be to dispense 
altogether with the massive inefficiencies arising from trying to engineer planning 
software within the traditional contracting system, and instead invest in the more 
decentralized user-integrated FalconView approach.  Another, advocated by Thorn, 
would be to start from scratch with a new system and a new contract for a robust mission 
planning system.  The latter would be realized with the initiation of new program of 
record in 1998, the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS), intended to replace 
FalconView.  Before the JMPS decision and its ensuing problems can be explored in 
more detail, however, it’s first important to explain how FalconView’s user group 
continued to grow and push its development in novel directions, JMPS notwithstanding. 
An Expanding View 
Expansion of the user base well beyond the F-16 community occurred in three 
stages: first with other Air Force platforms, particularly ANG C-130 airlift and Air Force 
Special Operations helicopters and MC-130s; later with Navy and Marine Corps tactical 
air; and finally with non-aviation and non-military communities.  One irony is that a 
small program originally limited to only F-16 support became popular with a very diverse 
user group, while large programs designed from the outset to support multiple aircraft 
communities failed even to satisfy their target users.  Lacking a guaranteed budget, 
FalconView had to be responsive to user needs and expanded in a decentralized manner 
only as long as it met them, whereas by contrast, AFMSS contractors could retain 
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lucrative cost-plus contracts by responding only to formal requirements, which tended to 
creep ever upward regardless of performance in the field.  Formal AFMSS requirements 
emerged through a bargaining process within acquisition organizations, involving 
contractors and staff officers echelons above and at least a tour away from unit-level 
operations, rather than FalconView’s user, “the guy flying the airplane right now.”85  
While this history so far has emphasized the Air Force/ANG fighter perspective, 
there was also a lot of software developed by aircrew in other communities.  The airlift 
community was especially conducive to the emergence of user-developed software: C-
130 squadrons had less money and more aircrew than the fighters; their operation tempo 
was slower and more predictable, providing time to develop solutions for stable 
problems; and aircraft had room for aircrew to bring extra computers with them in flight.  
Since navigators already did their own planning, they “could fly with beta software 
because if they screwed up it was their wings anyway.”86  One ANG navigator, Major 
Mike Bartgis, tried to encourage FPLAN developers to incorporate C-130 functionality 
because existing user-developed programs, Low Level Flight Planner (LLFP) and 
Computed Air Release Point (CARP), had become unwieldy with each port to a new 
operating system.  Unfortunately, FPLAN ran into similar re-architecting problems, and 
fighter aircrew were also not enthusiastic about supporting transportation.  So during the 
Gulf War, Bartgis wrote a new program that incorporated functionality of LLFP and 
CARP with FPLAN and loaded data onto the C-130’s Self Contained Navigation System 
(SCNS).  He noted, “The first lesson I learned is all this is a lot easier than contractors 
make it sound.”87 
In 1992 Bartgis joined the ANG Air Staff and began distributing his program to units.  
While there he met Sandford and Thorn and realized that it would be easier to piggyback 
on the emerging FalconView/PFPS effort than to start a new one, because even within the 
Guard, which had a lower status than the active duty Air Force, airlift was lower-status 
still.  Willing to wait for the F-16 exclusive version before channeling what limited 
funding could be found for C-130 functionality, Bartgis became a key member of the 
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automated mission planning community. 88   Similarly, Air Force Special Operations 
officers found money to support displaying towers and other electronic chart updates (E-
CHUM) to support low flying helicopters and MC-130s.89 
Thus a group of aviators from different communities began to gravitate around 
FalconView development and lay in more institutionalized support for a growing user 
community.  A dozen or so officers held the first Mission Planning User Conference 
(MPUC) at the Eglin Officers Club in 1993.  This became an annual forum to discuss 
developments in both PFPS/FalconView and the formal programs, attendance growing to 
over 1100 people in 2000.90  AFMSS representatives attended the meetings, downplaying 
the significance of the first PFPS 3.0 distribution in 1998 and dismissing FalconView as 
an amateur toy; by 2001 the same speakers were apologizing to the crowd that they 
hadn’t been able to divest themselves of the big Unix systems fast enough.91  Bartgis on 
the ANG staff also began a detailed monthly newsletter called “AFMSS MPS and PFPS 
News” that went out to a growing mailing list with detailed technical, operational, and 
programmatic detail on both Unix and PC systems.  Both the user conference and 
newsletter again exemplify the trend in mission planning whereby officers supported both 
formal and informal programs at the same time.   
As user innovation theory would expect, aircrew-developed applications were freely 
revealed, and a user innovation community was emerging.  Free revealing is common 
among military user innovators; in fact, any code written by servicemembers while in 
government employ is legally government property, whereas contractor-written code is 
often proprietary licensed software.  FalconView developers consciously decided the 
                                                 
88 This cooperation highlighted the fact that “user” is not a monolithic category, since users from one 
community can misunderstand the requirements from another just as contractors do.  When Eglin, with its 
close relationship with fighter operators, began trying to develop PFPS navigation tools for C-130s, they 
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Thaedra actually became a fully functional airdrop planner, essentially a work around of the work around!  
That is, airlift user innovation was catalyzed by having to wait for fighter user innovation to mature.  Notes 
from the Thaedra help-file also exhibit the pride that amateur developers have in their efforts: “Thaedra 
was written by Captain Scott (Scooter) Stephenson…at home, as an unsanctioned personal project.  
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application would be free government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) software so that any 
government employee could have access.   
The emergence of a self-reinforcing user innovation community had already begun 
with the diffusion of software as aircrew traveled around the world for exercises and 
operations.  Yet, in a military environment where users’ activity is regulated and users 
transfer often, more institutional support was needed.  For FalconView, this was provided 
through the cultivation of small groups of engineers at GTRI and Eglin with low turnover 
and close user interaction, eventual cooperation with AFMSS, and most importantly, the 
longevity and perseverance of key individuals.  Even though officers transferred, they 
moved through aviation commands and took FalconView with them, often taking 
positions within mission planning acquisition organizations.  Furthermore, because ANG 
personnel policy differs from the active duty Air Force, Major Bartgis was able to remain 
on the Air Staff for eight years, ensuring some continuity and able to wait out obstacles in 
the active duty force.92  His role passed to Major Paul Hastert in 2000, an MC-130 aviator 
in the Air Force Reserve who had written data cartridge-loading software to work around 
yet another dysfunctional official Unix system called MiniCAMPS.  As of 2005, Hastert 
still worked in the Air Force Combat Support Office, providing a similar kind of 
continuity.93 
The Navy acquisition experience with automated mission planning was frustratingly 
similar to that of the Air Force with MSS II and AFMSS.  The Navy Unix minicomputer 
program was called Tactical Air Mission Planning System (TAMPS).   The system itself 
was so large it had to be hoisted from the aircraft carrier hanger deck and through the 
floor into the intelligence center above.94  Having evolved from a Tomahawk cruise 
missile planning system, the TAMPS contract had passed through three different 
contractors, and was completely out of synch with aircrew needs.  TAMPS routinely 
failed operational test and evaluations because of both interface and basic functionality 
issues.  Hank Davison, a former A-7 pilot working as a civilian TAMPS instructor at 
Naval Air Station Lemoore in the 1990s, confessed, “When just planning, I was having a 
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hard time coming up with a use for TAMPS.  It took more time than with a pile of charts 
and scissors, which was faster and more accurate for adept planners.” 95   Although 
TAMPS was the only way to load F/A-18 data cartridges, Navy regulations classified 
damage to the cartridge as a class C mishap, technically grounding the aircraft, so 
maintenance officers were reticent to let aircrew take the cartridge since aircrew could 
still plan without it.96  The introduction of the AGM-84E Stand-Off Land Attack Missile 
(SLAM) prior to the Gulf War finally made TAMPS use unavoidable, but even for 
SLAM planning aircrew preferred to use paper charts and informal planning techniques, 
only then transferring the results to TAMPS to use it merely as a very expensive data 
cartridge loader.97   
To get around TAMPS, naval aviators obtained copies of FPLAN during joint 
exercises with the Air Force.  The Naval Mission Planning Systems (NAVMPS) office 
was also increasingly frustrated with the system because of the cost ($200,000 per 
workstation), schedule slips, and intense user dissatisfaction.  TAMPS was tied to F/A-18 
production, which meant that NAVMPS itself actually had a relatively small independent 
budget and limited leverage.  An F/A-18 aviator working at NAVMPS and long-time 
FPLAN user, Marine Corps Major John “Festus” Bennett, thus saw cheap PCs and 
PFPS/FalconView —free government-owned software—as a viable alternative.   
Bennett worked proactively to get the software out to anyone with a Navy or Marine 
Corps aviation connection, visiting with aircrew and mailing out hundreds of CDs to 
“beta users” before it was ever certified.  Network managers complained that they would 
find it on one squadron machine and remove it, only to come back and find it on several 
more later.  Bennett decided he needed fleet “disciples” to overcome the criticism of 
scientists and engineers at Navy labs who were focused on Unix and hostile to 
“hobbyshop” PC efforts.  To build official support, he would ghost-write messages for 
units to send to the Chief of Naval Operations staff (OPNAV) with glowing evaluations 
and endorsements of PFPS, creatively manipulating bureaucratic process to build 
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institutional support for the emerging FalconView user community.  As grassroots 
support grew, FalconView “was somewhere between a cult and a virus.”  
The entry point into the Marine Corps was Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics 
Squadron One (MAWTS-1) in Yuma, which provided early support for Bennett’s efforts 
with a friendly evaluation.  From there it diffused to Marine aviation and ground units, as 
well as Army helicopter units training with them.  FalconView proved a real boon to 
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs).  Deployed on several ships in an Amphibious 
Readiness Group, MEU planning often involved flying annotated maps by helicopter 
around to the different ships.  With FalconView, Marine planners could just transmit 
shape files between ships, reducing the number of flights.  Marine use led NAVMPS to 
fund some important features in FalconView, such as a program called GEORect that 
enabled users to take a scanned image of a map or image and tie it to geocoordinates in 
the FalconView environment.  This allowed Marines afloat to digitize more detailed 
ground maps than aviators typically needed, and which NIMA was often unable to 
provide.98 
The groundswell of user support led to the approval in 1998 of a Navy PFPS 
distribution channel via NAVMPS.  Although now empowered to send out accredited N-
PFPS CDs to Navy and Marine Corps units, it was still a very informally run, minimally 
funded operation.  This actually provided Bennett, later joined by Hank Davison and 
another naval aviator named Jon Drof, with a lot of flexibility to respond to user requests.  
This increased user enthusiasm because they felt they had a voice in development, unlike 
with TAMPS.  If Bennett and Davison needed Navy-specific applications, they could just 
add them to the N-PFPS distribution.  If new features were needed, they could leverage 
the existing Air Force PFPS contract and send money, usually in small $100,000 lumps, 
rather than go through a difficult source selection process.99 
This sort of decentralized development process facilitated the growth of FalconView 
functionality.  The actual requirements and integration was informally coordinated with 
GTRI and Eglin, which was successful because engineers either were former aviators or 
                                                 
98 Bennett, interview. 
99 Bennett, interview; Hank Davison, correspondence with author (3 April 2006). 
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had developed and maintained a close relationship with aircrew.    A standing contract 
with the Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill Air Force Base provided the vehicle for time 
and materials contracts.  One result of this was that FalconView’s future was often 
uncertain only six months ahead.  Most contributions were less than $200,000 (the outlier 
being a SOCOM contribution of $2 million in 2003), and if the team didn’t field 
something and get good aircrew feedback the program would be in jeopardy.  Major 
Thorn, Major Sandford, Lt. Col. Webster, and Major Bennett were always “shaking 
trees” for small amounts of money from AFMSS, the ANG, Air Force Reserve, Navy 
Mission Planning, or other organizations to keep Pyles’ team in business.  Every three 
months Pyles would have to call one of the aviators and warn, “We’re about to turn into 
pumpkins!  Do you have more work?”100  The result was something like competitive 
pressure for continuous improvement, quality control, and responsiveness to end-user 
needs, unlike typical defense contracts. 
As in the fable about stone soup, different organizations that wanted new features 
contributed money or prototypes, and these improvements then became available to all 
users who might leverage them in novel ways.  For example, the incorporation of digital 
terrain elevation data (DTED) and threat masking algorithms to calculate the effect of 
terrain features on radar coverage was funded by Air Force Special Operations so that 
aviators could predict which surface to air threats could observe or shoot at them, but this 
feature could also be used by ground forces to predict what terrain they would be able to 
see from observation points.  The Navy funded enhancements like digital nautical charts, 
image georectification, and a 3D flight simulator (“SkyView”).  Army and U.S. Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM) contributions followed in earnest in 2003, adding 
ground force symbology, tactical graphics overlays, topographic lines, and illumination 
planning to estimate shadowing based on sun or moon position. 101   The minimal, 
decentralized, institutional framework for FalconView development allowed different 
                                                 
100 Pyles, interview. 
101  Chris Bailey, “Department of Defense Usage of FalconView,” GTRI White Paper (2005), 
http://www.falconview.org/docs/FalconView%20Usage%20Throughout%20the%20Department%20Of%2
0Defense.pdf.  Army helicopter pilots were eager to use FalconView as an alternative to their own 
dysfunctional Unix system, the Army Mission Planning System (AMPS). 
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service components to achieve a degree of interoperability and coordination that 
ostensibly “Joint” programs aspired to, yet without the centralized oversight. 
Second-Order User Innovation 
The first wave of user innovation in mission planning that gave rise to FalconView 
culminated in official recognition and support for the application.  FalconView 
development requirements were certainly handled more informally than in other software 
contracts, and FalconView contractors nurtured a closer relationship with operational 
users, yet the design of FalconView proper became, nevertheless, a contract-mediated, 
civilian-managed engineering project.  With the stabilization of this development, 
however, a second wave of user innovation extended the application’s functionality, and 
many complementary applications emerged outside of GTRI and Eglin.  FalconView 
essentially provided a toolkit, inadvertently at first and later deliberately, that users could 
use to experiment with novel ways of automating military information processing tasks. 
Extensions might be as simple as combining existing features for some unforeseen 
purpose, as when bomber crews began using commercial GPS antennas and data loggers 
not only for real time navigation, but also for more accurate post-mission analysis.102  
Many were programs that generated output files that FalconView could read and display 
over maps and imagery, as with a program called Sensor that displayed the actual 
footprint on the ground of an aircraft’s forward-looking sensors.103  Others were low-
level utilities that made FalconView more versatile, such as Major Hastert’s PFPS 
Update, which automated sharing data among different computers when FalconView was 
originally a stand-alone application.104  Private contractors or government civilians also 
designed FalconView complements, requested by users but funded by the services, for 
inclusion on the PFPS distribution.  Interesting examples include the bird avoidance 
                                                 
102 Shawn Fleming, “Using FalconView for Situational Awareness and Post Mission Reconstruction,” 
Presentation at Mission Planning Users Group Moving Map Working Group (1999). 
103 Davison, interview.  For example, if the forward-looking infrared (FLIR) lens, like the cockpit display 
screen, is square, the actual area on the ground sensed by the FLIR is trapezoidal because the sensor looks 
down at an angle.  Aircrew could also use Sensor in reverse, deforming target imagery to produce a 
prediction of what would appear in the cockpit display, aiding visual target acquisition.  A very similar 
program allowed bomber aircrew to dynamically plot the expected pattern on the ground for gravity 
(“dumb”) bombs. 
104 Hastert, interview.  PFPS Update was, significantly, the first user-developed application to be included 
on the PFPS CD distribution. 
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model (BAM), which draws from a database of migratory bird routes to create graphical 
overlays depicting the probability of bird strikes at a given time of year,105 and TaskView, 
which parses the Air Tasking Order into an interactive FalconView overlay.106 
Some user applications helped bridged data from “stovepipe” systems that didn’t 
communicate with one another, or worked around them altogether.  These were often 
written as Visual Basic scripts within Microsoft Office documents to get around 
configuration restrictions, with the effect of adding custom functionality to both 
FalconView and Office.  For example, a database application called Quiver, designed by 
an intelligence officer on the USS Kitty Hawk, managed target and threat intelligence 
data, outputted target and threat overlays for FalconView, and automatically generated 
PowerPoint presentations with target imagery for strike briefs. 107   A similar user-
developed application called Vulture managed Air Force intelligence and operational 
planning information for an Air Operations Center, sidestepping some inconveniences of 
another large Unix system (Theater Battle Management Core System, TBMCS).  One 
especially versatile tool called Excel2FV made it possible to import a wide variety of 
intelligence and other data formats into FalconView.  As an officer managing the battle in 
                                                 
105 Bartgis, interview.  Bird strikes are a serious problem, and have led to the loss of or damage to many 
high-performance aircraft. 
106 The ATO is a long and complicated document with aircraft and mission pairings and associated airspace 
control measures.  Parsing it out by hand used to take hours.  Pamela Bowers, “CrossTalk Honors the 2002 
Top 5 Quality Software Projects Finalists,” CrossTalk: The Journal of Defense Software Engineering (July 
2003), http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2003/07/top5finalists.html . 
107 Quiver’s inventor, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Paul Wilt, demonstrated the program at the Naval Strike 
and Air Warfare Center in Fallon, Nevada, where he teamed up with this paper’s author to improve Quiver 
for use aboard all Carrier Intelligence Centers (CVIC).  Quiver was popular with intelligence personnel and 
aircrew, but quite unpopular with SPAWAR, the Navy’s information technology procurement and 
management command, since it competed with an expensive Unix intelligence system (GCCS-I3) and was 
perceived as beyond the control of configuration managers.  Despite thousands of lines of Visual Basic 
code and operating system calls, the application was still nominally “just an Access database,” so 
SPAWAR technically could not prevent Quiver’s use; indeed, many contemporary user developed 
applications masquerade as Office documents because “real” executable programs are uncertified.  
Ultimately SPAWAR decided to incorporate Quiver features into a future version of GCCS-I3 and wait for 
its military supporters to transfer to new assignments.  As with FalconView and AFMSS/JMPS, the 
programmatic version spent a lot of money but never managed to reproduce the successful features of the 
unofficial version.  Yet unlike FalconView, Quiver never found an institutional sanctuary—advocates with 
staying power willing to work both formal and informal channels—to weather the resistance.  A version of 
Quiver called A3 continued evolving in the Naval Special Warfare community.  A3 played a critical role in 
the management of intelligence for SEAL operations during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, often going through 
several new “spiral releases” each week as unexpected information management challenges emerged.  
Unfortunately, history repeated itself yet again as A3 moved into programmatic channels, changed names, 
and withered away. 
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Afghanistan’s Shahikot valley during Operation Anaconda commented, Excel2FV 
“literally saved lives countless times and was the ONLY way we could've managed the 
battle situation.”108 
Recognizing the extent of this activity, GTRI first provided deliberate third party 
programmer support in 2000 by exposing application program interfaces (APIs) in 
version 3.1, and in 2002 by providing a more robust software development kit (SDK) in 
version 3.2.  End users now had the ability to add buttons, control the FalconView display 
from other applications, and accept input from the FalconView interface.  This sort of 
third party development support was already an important market generating mechanism 
in the civilian software industry.  When software companies create powerful macro 
languages for their applications, like Microsoft’s Visual Basic in Office, or expose 
interfaces, modules, code libraries, or web services that other programmers can 
incorporate into their own applications, this creates opportunities for third parties, 
including users, to become experts in customization.  This expands the market for the 
original application by enabling it to adapt to domains wasn’t designed for, without the 
original developer having to pay for the work.  This of course introduces configuration 
management liabilities for third party developers, as changes to APIs, for example, can 
break their applications, and they are limited to only the functionality the original 
developer decides to expose.  Yet on the whole, third-party toolkits are a good way for 
                                                 
108 William A. Hastings, correspondence with author (28 October 2005).  Excel2FV author Lt. Col. Paul 
Hastert writes (correspondence, 13 October 2005), “I had seen for a long time that there was a need to 
ingest data from external sources into PFPS, but hadn't done anything about it until 9/11.  At that point…I 
was spending a lot of time at the CAOC [Combined Air Operations Center] in PSAB [Prince Sultan Air 
Base, Saudi Arabia] and definitely saw a huge need for the program.  Unfortunately I also discovered that 
the chance of getting an ‘unauthorized’ executable on the CAOC network, let alone the [Top Secret] 
network was limited….I decided to shift…to Visual Basic for Applications (VBA)…the program 
[Excel2FV] masquerades as an MS Office file (in my case a Word Document).”  Hastert teamed up with 
Maj. Hastings in the CAOC, who writes (correspondence): “We actually didn't start using it until the battle 
[Anaconda] had started and had been going maybe about 2 days.  There came a point where the data we 
were using was becoming unmanageable…. It was desperation that forced the issue… At one point in the 
chaos, I went over and found an airman who I had worked with at a previous assignment and I knew was 
good with computers.  I told him to ‘crack the code’, figure it out, and write down the steps necessary to 
import the data from excel (using Excel2FV) into drawing files…. At some point, I found Paul and asked if 
there could be a few modifications.  I really didn't expect any results.  My experience with new software 
and the accompanying engineers wasn't positive.  It usually took weeks for them to have a solution.  By the 
end of my shift, Paul had worked out what I needed….I think we made mods almost daily to the program 
until by the end, almost the entire targets shop was using this program like it was going out of style (and 
wondering how we had done it before without it)…. Wherever I went after that, I preached the gospel of 
Excel2FV and trained whomever I could.  I'd have to say it was pretty incredible…And we didn’t need to 
wait years for an unusable product after spending millions of dollars.” 
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companies to encourage and leverage lead user innovation to create value (Thomke and 
Von Hippel, 2002).109 
Explicit third party programmer support in FalconView led to an explosion of new 
applications created by users, many on a very small scale never heard of beyond the unit 
in which they originated.110  It also enabled GTRI to keep the FalconView team small, 
never more than twenty people including administrative support, and to offload support 
for their diverse user population onto third parties, including users themselves.111  By 
designing in adaptability, GTRI recognized that it would often have no idea how 
FalconView was being employed.  This is a big contrast to large consolidated programs 
like MSS, AFMSS, TAMPS, and JMPS, which on the one hand attempted to centrally 
manage support for a very heterogeneous group of aviators, explicitly defining use cases 
and functionality, and on the other hand provided no allowance whatsoever to non-
aviation user groups because they were outside of their aviation-only charter. 
These non-aviation users are a diverse lot, actively adapting FalconView for 
purposes well beyond its initial conception as an aviation planner.112  National Guard 
military police in Iraq have used FalconView to aid debriefing Iraqi detainees who are 
unable to read maps but can point out locations on unclassified imagery.113  Unclassified 
map and satellite imagery also makes it easier U.S. forces to share planning materials 
with coalition partners, as well as to send CD-ROM batch updates via regular mail.114  
FalconView’s moving map, GPS feed, and tactical radio feed have seen wide use in 
special operations aircraft and tactical vehicles, including strapped onto the gas tanks of 
All Terrain Vehicles.115  Further blurring the boundary between mission planning and 
execution software, users reconfigured FalconView to manage Predator Unmanned Aerial 
                                                 
109  Stefan Thomke and Eric Von Hippel, "Customers As Innovators: A New Way to Create Value," 
Harvard Business Review vol. 80, no. 4 (2002). 
110 Bailey, “Department of Defense Usage of FalconView.” 
111 Chris Bailey, interview with author (14 October 2005). 
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government software.  CDs can be copied or loaded onto multiple machines.  GTRI estimated 13,000 total 
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113 Jason Black, interview with author (31 October 2005). 
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New York Times (26 November 2004). 
115 Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York, NY: 
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Vehicle (UAV) operations in combat: whereas remote pilots used to have limited 
situational awareness through the “soda straw” of the Predator’s camera eye, multiple 
UAV tracks could now be displayed in real-time over detailed satellite imagery of the 
operational area, on multiple FalconView computers anywhere on the network.116 
Other unusual uses have included recreating geographic conditions to aid aircraft 
crash forensics, tracking whale migrations for a Navy environmental study,117 or a tool 
funded by the Air Force Surgeon General to analyze directed energy blinding threats.118  
Users in government organizations outside the Department of Defense have obtained 
copies of FalconView and contributed new features through the same military contract 
vehicle.  The U.S. Forest Service uses it to plan airdrops of fire retardants and to track the 
spread of forest fires.  U.S. Customs funded capability for tracking small drug-running 
aircraft.119  The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) funds functionality and 
distributes a version of FalconView to the intelligence community.  FalconView has been 
provided to twenty-five other countries through U.S. foreign military sales.120  Countries 
that have purchased U.S. F-16s usually receive PFPS/FalconView for mission planning, 
and it also receives non-aviation use, as in Colombia where it’s used for intelligence 
fusion in counter-insurgency operations.  China, moreover, may have illegally obtained a 
                                                 
116 Paul Hastert, “Spiral Development in Wartime,” PowerPoint presentation to NDIA (2005).  During the 
Kosovo war, frustrated Predator operators developed the concept “on the back of a napkin” of embedding 
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copy via hackers who broke into computers at Redstone Arsenal to steal, among other 
things, FalconView 3.2 (Thornburgh, 2005).121 
Many of the second-order user innovations built on the FalconView foundation 
traced a by-now familiar pattern.  Some tech-savvy user with operational experience 
encountered some pressing operational need and rapidly prototyped a solution with the 
limited resources that his organizational and technological milieu afforded.  Frequent 
design iterations (“spirals”) incorporated feedback from operational, sometimes combat, 
employment.  Solutions were freely revealed to comrades, and user/developer enthusiasm 
was high.  Every step of this process they contended with expensive but dysfunctional 
legacy systems and limitations on development and diffusion imposed by configuration 
and security regulations.  That is, user innovations built on FalconView bore a striking 
resemblance to the user innovations that gave rise to FalconView itself.  User innovation 
with information technology could make real contributions to combat power, yet 
bureaucratic routines continued to treat this as aberrant activity that could eventually be 
incorporated into formal requirements-based acquisition. 
JMPS Up and Down 
Even though FalconView/PFPS became the primary aviation mission planning 
system for the Air Force, Navy, and Special Operational Command from 1998 on, 
although it catalyzed adaptive second-order user innovation well beyond aviation, and 
despite the fact that AFMSS was humbled with the firing of its director in 1997 and the 
Air Force endorsement of PFPS, the acquisition community’s immediate response was to 
launch yet another formal program, the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS).  
FalconView advocates like Sandford and Webster correctly foresaw that the AFMSS and 
TAMPS histories of mounting expense and inefficiency were about to be repeated, but 
they were a tiny minority amid the many parties invested in the traditional acquisition 
system.  Thorn’s contrasting preference to reform the system from within via a fresh start 
and a new contract found many more sympathetic allies. 
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Ironically, the arguments that FalconView proponents employed early on to secure 
needed bureaucratic support (or at least toleration) for its emergence would later be 
turned against them.  To get Air National Guard funding, Sandford had articulated a 
vision of Microsoft-based mission planning software running on cheap commercial PCs.  
Accordingly, throughout the 1990s the debate was framed in narrowly technical terms as 
a contest between hobby-shop PC efforts and unwieldy Unix programs of record.  This 
resonated with Air Force and Navy aviators who were quite frustrated with their clunky 
Unix boxes.  As long as MSS, AFMSS and TAMPS programs were stuck laboring 
through their commitments to the Unix installed base and with their great bureaucratic 
weight, this debate played out well for PFPS/FalconView, the only viable PC mission 
planner available.  From the perspective of the AFMSS and NAVMPS program offices, 
there seemed to be an obvious architectural lesson in this: a single PC-based program 
might be better than struggling with service-specific Unix “stovepipes.”  From this point 
of view, acquisition processes seemed adequate; they had simply been acquiring the 
wrong kind of product.  Switching to a better PC-based product, so it seemed, would 
make FalconView unnecessary. 
Framing the problem like this, however, downplayed the fact that the secret to 
FalconView’s success was less that it ran on a PC and much more that end-users were 
intimately involved in its development.  FalconView requirements were coordinated 
informally.  Engineers writing code were frequently—often daily—talking to aircrew in 
operational units.  Users were actually creating new complementary applications.  
Success was built up in small increments of working functionality.  Such a process would 
likely have created decent Unix planning software because the problem it solved—
reducing the transaction costs involved in marrying up tacit user needs with software 
development expertise—was not architecture dependent (Moreover, many early CS/2 
user efforts were Unix programs).  FalconView designers understood this well, but the 
stark “PC vs. Unix” distinction was easier to argue in a bureaucratic context than 
subtleties about transaction costs in software design.  The acquisition program offices 
discounted FalconView’s innovative process, however, and focused only on the product: 
a common PC-based mission planning system. 
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Even more, program management offices (PMOs) were actively critical of the 
process.  They had built up animosity with PFPS/FalconView and were determined to 
replace it.  “The services would use us as a whip against the PMO,” John Pyles recalls, 
because FalconView oft provided new functionality on the cheap that the programs said 
was impossible.122  The programs in turn argued that FalconView was maverick software 
unsupported by adequate testing, review, and configuration management regimes; it was 
not scalable, reliable, or interoperable (ignoring that FalconView’s wide demand-driven 
diffusion suggested the contrary).  In 1998, right on the heels of the PFPS victory over 
AFMSS, the Electronic Systems Center (ESC) commissioned an independent Carnegie 
Mellon study of PFPS.  The study recommended that, although it was well-designed 
software, PFPS should not be the system of record because it was too personality-
dependent and therefore unsustainable.  The program offices appealed to the Carnegie 
Mellon report and to austere Defense Department configuration management directives to 
undermine the renegade PFPS.123 
On top of this, NAVMPS did not want to depend on PFPS because it was, since its 
1997 coup, officially an AFMSS program; essentially, the Navy did not want to replace 
TAMPS with an Air Force program.124  Bureaucratic deadlock was dealt with in the usual 
way, by creating a new over-arching Joint entity.  The services were finally digesting the 
implications of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996 “Joint Vision 2010” called for complete operational, 
technical, doctrinal, and cultural “Jointness.”  What better way to demonstrate 
compliance with the new spirit of the times than the creation of a new program?   
With the inauguration of JMPS in late 1998, FalconView once again officially 
became merely a temporary stopgap awaiting the development of the larger program of 
record.  FalconView’s purported unsustainability risked becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  Joe Webster and John Pyles had conducted an internal architecture review and 
were well aware that FalconView needed a major revision.  Although it ran fast and 
                                                 
122 Pyles, interview. 
123  Thorn, interview (13 October 2005).  Defense Information Infrastructure, Common Operating 
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reliably, there were legacies dating back to its DOS origins constraining expansion, and 
new opportunities in the latest Microsoft NT networked operating system they wanted to 
exploit.  However, all new development money was going to JMPS, and PFPS was 
officially on life support.125  Modest lumps of money would continue to flow to PFPS 
from various parties for specific features, as discussed previously, but none of this 
supported the kind of deep re-architecting Webster and Pyles sought.  JMPS proponents 
could furthermore point to the FalconView’s need for an overhaul as yet another 
justification for starting anew with JMPS. 
Initial hopes for JMPS were high, even among many aviators who had been active 
proponents of PFPS against AFMSS and TAMPS.126  Colonel Thorn even returned to 
active duty full-time to take charge of the JMPS project, hoping to use the fresh start to 
reconstruct the advantages of FalconView with the resources of scale and bureaucratic 
legitimacy a managed program could provide.  The initial goal appeared achievable: 
simply replicate the existing PFPS/FalconView capability on a scalable and extensible PC 
Windows architecture within eighteen months, reusing existing software where practical.  
Less remarked upon was the fact that JMPS—a Joint program destined for Air Force, 
Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Special Operations aviation—had a far more ambitious 
scope than AFMSS, which likewise had been far more ambitious than MSS II.  One 
unlearned lesson was that coordination costs could be expected to scale steeply upward.  
A single program for everyone also made requirement creep inevitable, even though it 
was hoped that scoping initial production to PFPS functionality would control it.  It 
turned out that PFPS proponents’ optimism for JMPS would be short lived as 
bureaucratic habits in the acquisition system proved stubbornly resistant to change. 
The JMPS systems integration contract was awarded to Northrop Gumman in 1999.  
Cursed with a generous $50 million budget to re-implement PFPS 3.1, hundreds of 
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engineers and managers were brought in, interminable meetings were held, an avalanche 
of slideshows, messages, flowcharts, and production plans was generated, and the project 
started suffocating with red tape.  By 2001, cost and schedule overruns began to threaten 
the program’s existence, so Northrop Grumman started cutting corners to keep it 
afloat.127  With multiple subcontractors involved and incessant development problems, 
the bulk of effort was expended on coordination within the program and the contractors, 
rather than between users and developers.  Things that were easy in FalconView became 
hard in JMPS. 128   Exasperated with the situation, the original three FalconView 
developers left GTRI in 2000, and Thorn retired from JMPS in 2002.  A certified, 
operational first version of JMPS had still not been fielded as of early 2006, six years 
after the program had originally planned to field a replacement for the 1999 version of 
FalconView/PFPS. 
Exacerbating JMPS inability to adequately meet initial requirements, users’ 
operational needs continued to evolve.  In Iraq throughout the 1990s, the US conducted 
No Fly Zone patrols and periodic strikes.  In Kosovo in 1999, the US fought the largest 
air war since Desert Storm.  In these operations the bulk of mission planning was digital, 
and there was a greater emphasis than ever before on time-critical precision strike, which 
entailed a greater information processing burden.  Inevitably, aircrew and staff officers 
discovered new items for their wish lists.  Major combat operations in Afghanistan 
commencing in 2002 and Iraq in 2003 stressed mission planners in new ways yet, 
especially given the importance of special operations and ground force coordination in 
these operations.  The FalconView user group expanded dramatically beyond the aviation 
mission-planning jurisdiction of JMPS, as well as to foreign coalition partners who would 
not have access to JMPS.   
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This flux in the strategic environment was only mentioned indirectly in previous 
pages, but was as important on the demand side for user innovation as FalconView’s 
characteristics were on the supply side.  FalconView’s decentralized mode of 
development—freely available government software with an open architecture friendly to 
third-party development—promoted adaptation to new problems.  By contrast, JMPS 
response to emerging requirements was unavoidably constrained by a formal 
requirements vetting system, a complex and closely controlled architecture, and closed 
contractor-licensed software.  JMPS, a Joint service aviation mission planning system, 
also lacked both the means and mandate to respond to non-aviation user requirements.129  
While JMPS was still struggling to field its first version, four new operationally certified 
versions of FalconView fielded as of this writing.  Much of FalconView’s funding came 
from other organizations like Special Operations Command (SOCOM) not tied to JMPS.  
JMPS, like MSS II, AFMSS, and TAMPS before it, had much trouble adequately 
responding to its original requirements, and even if it managed to, the requirements had 
usually changed in the mean time. 
The future of JMPS and FalconView is far from settled.  The services appear locked 
in to JMPS because advanced aircraft like the F-22A, F-35, and F/A-18E/F require it to 
fly, and because of growing sunk costs and the opportunity costs of not developing 
alternatives.  While improvements have been made to PFPS/FalconView, largely funded 
by mission planning communities in the Army and SOCOM who view JMPS as 
extraordinarily high-risk, the PFPS architecture is not ready to provide all that is expected 
of JMPS.130  One interesting development in 2003 was that the original JMPS mapping 
engine developed by Boeing Autometric ran into so many problems that GTRI was given 
a contract to adapt the FalconView mapping engine for inclusion in JMPS (Bailey, 
2005d).  This helps GTRI address FalconView’s architectural challenges somewhat and 
means, ironically, that JMPS will include pieces of FalconView, and may even be 
subsidizing its own competition.  The organizational problems with JMPS development, 
however, appear to be intractable.  All the versions of FalconView have collectively cost 
                                                 
129 Paul Hastert, correspondence with author (31 October 2005), observes, “If it doesn't cut a cartridge then 
they've got no interest, and in many cases thinly veiled hostility that people are using ‘their’ software for 
something else.” 
130 E.g., real-time weather and web-services (Bailey, interview). 
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about $20 million since 1993, while JMPS will likely cost well over $1 billion in its first 
decade.  Colonel Thorn, in retrospect, estimated that it should have been possible to 
deliver everything JMPS was supposed to do for $200 million using the FalconView 
model.131   
It’s an open question whether FalconView’s non-aviation supporters—or even Navy 
and Air Force aviation commands alarmed with JMPS problems—will begin to seriously 
invest in a new FalconView, whether FalconView will just persist in its traditional role as 
perennial stopgap, or whether some new mission planning solution will emerge to 
displace both JMPS and FalconView.  Given the prominence of user innovation in 
mission planning software history, this last possibility shouldn’t be dismissed lightly, 
especially given that advances in cheap, powerful commercial geospatial software (as 
exemplified in Google’s Earth) continue to lower technical barriers to user innovation.  
At the same time, mission-planning software, like command, control, and intelligence 
software generally, has become a multi-billion dollar defense industry, with all the 
congressional, corporate, and bureaucratic politics that entails.  This will tend to raise 
organizational barriers to user innovation, since the field is far more crowded and 
regulated than ever before. 
Discussion: War upon the Map 
The 19th-century strategist Henri de Jomini wrote, “Strategy is the art of making war 
upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations.  Grand Tactics is the art 
of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, or 
bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground in contradistinction to 
planning upon a map.”132  Strategy flows from the top down in this classic conception, 
from the map to the territory.  Theories of military innovation, likewise, depict civilian 
leaders and senior officers leading innovative change.  However, digital mapping in the 
military developed in the opposite direction, bottom up from everyday operational 
concerns, discovering along the way a strategically important capability: lead users 
provided with powerful toolkits could extend functionality into new domains and 
                                                 
131 Thorn, interview (13 October 2005). 
132 Baron Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill, Project Gutenberg 
Ebook (2004), 69. 
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improve operational adaptability.  This blurred the distinction between designer and user, 
and for aircraft with moving maps, unmanned vehicles, and operations heavily dependent 
on reach-back intelligence, blurred the distinction between “fighting upon the ground” 
and “planning upon a map.” 
The history of automated mission planning is largely a clash between lead users in 
low-cost innovation niches and organizational resistance to change.  It is more than a 
single case, which supports some more confident generalization.  While FalconView is 
certainly the most significant application to emerge, other user-developed applications 
preceded it, developed with it, and were later built upon it.  Many user-developed 
applications emerged as workarounds to problems with an alphabet soup of formal 
programs (MSS I and II, AFMSS MPS, TAMPS, AMPS, MiniCAMPS, JMPS, GCCS, 
TBMCS, etc.), or explored totally new areas of functionality that the large programs 
ignored or said was too difficult.  An entire range of user-developed maintenance, 
scheduling, and other administrative applications has not even been discussed, nor have 
applications completely outside the domain of aviation.133  As a class, such inventions are 
genuine prototypes rather than just local expedients, and as such, they create the 
possibility for interaction or interference with formal acquisition.   
There are indeed idiosyncratic aspects to FalconView’s story: the maturing of PC 
hardware and Windows software; the Unix bias in formal programs; the development of 
critical technical complements like GPS, worldwide map and image data on CD-ROM, 
and data-hungry weapons systems; aircrew responsibility for their own planning 
techniques; the lower priority of the Air National Guard and Reserve with respect to the 
active duty Air Force and AFMSS; the demands and capabilities of the single-seat F-16 
                                                 
133 Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-Centric Warfare 
(Anapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 217-222, 354n, discusses the example of JOTS, a naval 
tactical computer decision aid cobbled together for $25,000 by the enthusiastic staff of the USS Eisenhower 
carrier battle group, commanded by Rear Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle, during a large exercise in 1981.  JOTS 
(originally the “Jerry O. Tuttle System,” later renamed the “Joint Operational Tactical System”) facilitated 
air and subsurface interceptions, providing more or less the same capabilities as a costly and complex 
system called Task Force Command Center (TFCC), which had been under development for the past 
decade by the Naval Electronic Systems Command.  Unlike TFCC, JOTS was designed by the staff that 
would use it in combat, some of the actual software written by sailors, and it soon replaced TFCC 
throughout the fleet.  By the early 1990s, Tuttle commanded the Naval Space and Electronic Warfare 
Command (SPAWAR, formerly the Naval Electronic Systems Command); JOTS’ transition from informal 
experiment to program of record was complete (Friedman, 2000: 217-222, 354n). 
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for both fighter and attack missions; key personalities involved in both formal and 
informal management; the immaturity of military computer network regulations; the end 
of the Cold War and the destabilizing of operational expectations.   
Nonetheless, the persistent repetition of a basic pattern is striking.  Formal programs 
had an extraordinarily difficult time producing quality software, while at the same time 
the barriers to entry came down for smart users to design software.  Traditional 
acquisition processes remained stubbornly in place, and user development activity, while 
often effective, was generally viewed as unsustainable and illegitimate.  This forced lead 
users to work within and around the system to develop their applications and to build in 
some modicum of organizational support for operation and maintenance.  This general 
pattern was traced not only by FalconView, but also by simpler applications that preceded 
it and others later built to complement it. 
In the case of FalconView, a passionate core of individuals remained actively 
engaged for several years, laying in an organizational and technical foundation to support 
diffusion to and adaptation by an expanding user group.  The profusion of user-developed 
functionality it catalyzed becomes most interesting when it’s seen not just as a collection 
of specific information processing applications, but as an improvement of military 
adaptability in general, a novel feature at the organizational level.  That is, the important 
FalconView macro-innovation was not a specific piece of PC mapping software, but the 
establishment of a versatile toolkit and a user innovation community supporting the 
decentralized emergence of novel information processing capability across the force.  
FalconView was a user innovation that made user innovation easier, a bottom-up process 
with macro-level consequences (that have not yet completely played out). 
How well does lead user innovation theory explain this case?  Given the challenge of 
meeting user needs (demand) with technological solutions (supply), the theory predicts 
that changes in supply and demand side factors that shift relative expectations of 
innovation-related gain among users and acquisition programs will shift the functional 
source of innovation.  If shifted to users, low-cost innovation will be concentrated with 
lead users who will freely-reveal their inventions and form self-reinforcing user 
innovation communities.   
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The two decades studied involved high supply side variation with the emergence of 
low-cost personal computing in the 1980s, increasing power and flexibility (to include 
sophisticated third-party development tools) throughout the 1990s, and growing computer 
literacy in the military population.  At the same time there was high growth in 
information-processing demand with the introduction of advanced capability aircraft and 
growing planning complexity in Joint operations and post-Cold War conflicts.  As 
expected in theory, falling barriers to production for users who stood to immediately 
benefit from solutions to emerging information processing problems allowed them to 
develop the first automated mission planning prototypes.  These lead users freely 
revealed their programs to others.  Only later as the market for mission planning became 
obvious did formal programs begin providing solutions, and then their advantages of 
scale were able to provide novel functionality, such as early digital mapping and 
precision-guided weapon support, and standardize training and support. 
Furthermore, even after formal programs were established, user innovation continued.  
Supply-side evolution of information technology continued lowering barriers to user 
production, aided by the emergence of FalconView itself, while user demand continued to 
evolve faster than the formal requirements cycle could keep up.  Exacerbating rapidly 
changing demand, the formal programs floundered on the difficulties of enterprise 
software development, further raising transaction costs for users dealing with programs.  
Thus lead users continued inventing their own solutions and sharing their software, aided 
by the emergence of semi-institutionalized user communities gravitating around 
FalconView. 
High values on the independent variables lead to the expected result on the 
dependent variable, the functional source of innovation, with the expected characteristics 
of lead user innovation, so by and large user innovation theory passes this military test.  
However, detailed process tracing of this case revealed some important conditions and 
constraints on user innovation in the military.  Most importantly, users had little choice 
but to cooperate to some degree with existing contracting procedures to provide 
innovations a stable incubation.  While small-scale programs like FPLAN might be 
totally user-produced, GTRI’s contract and engineering expertise was essential for 
supporting a more robust invention like FalconView.  These user-driven efforts, 
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furthermore, were often managed in conjunction with formal programs by officers with 
AFMSS and NAVMPS, as necessary supplements to the beleaguered programs.  This 
partial cooptation provided FalconView enough legitimacy to survive certification 
regimes, and staying power to accumulate a growing user community.   
This shows that the distinction between user innovation and formal acquisition can 
be an over-simplification, because what is important is the organizational context that 
allows one formal arrangement or another to thrive.  FalconView could go toe-to-toe with 
much larger Air Force programs because it was a contract sponsored and sheltered by the 
bureaucratically separate Air National Guard, and later adopted by key personalities in 
Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations acquisition channels.  FalconView’s 
legitimation, along with certification of Microsoft’s Office and other programs on 
military networks, provided an umbrella for second-order user innovation as long as it 
used these approved components.  This also restricted some lead users from pursuing the 
ideal solutions they might like, as network management regulations imposed sometimes-
insurmountable barriers to production, even if technical capabilities existed in the 
marketplace.  Finally, even the FalconView user innovation community, while self-
reinforcing as the theory expected, required some institutional architecting to support it.  
Lead users could be quite creative in coming up with solutions for their needs, but they 
had to remain attuned to organizational constraints and resources as much as technical 
ones.   
Lead user theory generally performs well in a military environment, but it is vital to 
factor in regulatory constraints and political support and opposition when analyzing 
expected innovation-related gains.  Within an organization, moreover, although some 
informal user collaboration is possible, a robust user innovation community requires the 
consent and support of formal organizational authority.  Given the organizational support 
needed for protecting user innovation communities, it’s reasonable to expect that 
increasingly ambitious levels of user innovation would indeed require promotion and 
protection from senior officers as Stephen Rosen or civilians as Barry Posen would 
expect.  Further research should explore these dynamics more in depth.   
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In the substantive area of military software development, it should be expected that 
as military operations grow increasingly complex and computer-dependent, (1) software 
acquisition efforts managed by traditional procurement processes will continue to fail to 
provide quality software, and (2) the informal user-developed applications arising in the 
lacunae will usually be rather immature or stunted in the absence of exceptional 
platforms like FalconView that can catalyze their development.  The prevalence of 
information technology innovation by military personnel itself constitutes an important 
organizational innovation, making modern information-intensive operations possible, but 
it is also an incomplete one because it is by and large still organizationally illegitimate.   
Solutions to this challenge will require re-conceiving enterprise software acquisition 
to more actively incorporate lead user innovation rather than merely collecting formal 
user requirements.  It’s beyond the scope of this paper to offer any detailed theoretical or 
policy analysis. 134   Nevertheless it’s likely that the intensive growth of information 
processing activity and technology in the military will necessitate new conceptions of 
military production, personnel, and organization.  As Dallas Irvine pointed out with 
respect to a previous generation of military information technology: 
“The art of war therefore became, in a sense that it had not been before, an art to be 
pursued upon the map, and with an immensely greater number of permutations and 
combinations possible than ever before.  Obviously, the conduct of war upon this level 
required a far different order of intelligence, knowledge, preparation, and skill than the 
command of a visible mass of men upon a visible terrain.”135  
                                                 
134  Gompert, et al., Extending the User's Reach, is one recent attempt to analyze the pathologies of 
Department of Defense information technology acquisition and the promise of user innovation, but the 
authors’ major recommendation is, inexplicably, to further centralize requirements with U.S. Joint Forces 
Command.  Hope springs eternal that ever more “Jointness” might treat the acquisition blues, but this is 
surely a cure worse than the disease, being antithetical to the decentralized nature of user innovation. 
135 Dallas D. Irvine, "The Origin of Capital Staffs," The Journal of Modern History vol. 10, no. 2 (1938): 
161-179. 
